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Federal Habeas in the Information Age
Wayne A. Logan
t
One would be hard-pressed to identify a more extolled, and
storied, aspect of the Anglo-American legal tradition than the
writ of habeas corpus. Tracing its lineage back to the Magna
Carta, the Great Writ was so revered by the Framers of the U.S
Constitution that they expressly prohibited its suspension
except in times of extreme governmental distress.' Writing in
1868, Chief Justice Salmon Chase characterized habeas as "the
most important human right in the Constitution," the "best and
only sufficient defense of personal freedom."2 Justice Brennan,
t Associate Professor, William Mitchell College of Law. B.A., Wesleyan
University; M.A., State University of New York at Albany; J.D., University of
Wisconsin. I thank Professors Eric Janus, David Logan, Yale Rosenberg, and
Larry Yackle for their helpful comments in the preparation of this Article.
1. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
the public Safety may require it."). For comprehensive discussions of the
writ's suspension during wartime, see MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF
LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1991); WILLIAM H.
REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WAR TIME (1998).
For explorations of the common law and historic origins of the writ more
generally, see WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS
CORPUS (1980); ROBERT S. WALKER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL
DEVELOPMENT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS A WRIT OF LIBERTY (1960); Zechariah
Chafee, Jr., The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution, 32 B.U. L.
REV. 143 (1952); Clarke D. Forsythe, The Historical Origins of Broad Federal
Habeas Review Reconsidered, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1079 (1995); Dallin H.
Oaks, Legal History in the High Court: Habeas Corpus, 64 MICH. L. REV. 451
(1966); Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension Clause: Is There a
Constitutional Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 MICH.
L. REV. 862 (1994).
2. Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1868). Blackstone referred
to habeas as "the most celebrated writ in English law." 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129. Alexander Hamilton, in responding to
criticism that the Constitution lacked the protections afforded by the Bill of
Rights, sought to neutralize concern by pointing to the availability of the writ,
characterizing it as among "the greater securities to liberty." THE FEDERALIST
No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton); see also 10 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY
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writing almost one hundred years later, observed that the
history of habeas "is inextricably intertwined with the growth
of fundamental rights of personal liberty."3
The writ has enjoyed its preeminent place in history
because of its simple yet radical purpose: to the hold
government accountable for restraints imposed upon its
citizens in contravention of U.S law.4 The last two decades,
however, have not been generous to habeas. Congress and the
Supreme Court have repeatedly imposed new procedural
hurdles or otherwise restricted its availability,5 developments
exhaustively addressed by others elsewhere. 6 The central focus
here, rather, is a discrete but fundamental aspect of habeas
jurisprudence-the requirement that a petitioner be in
"custody" before habeas jurisdiction can be conferred. In
contrast to the aforementioned limits, the interpretative
breadth of the custody requirement has actually experienced a
notable expansion over time as a result of judicial construction.
In particular, since the early 1960s the Supreme Court has
distanced itself from the historic requirement that a petitioner
OF ENGLISH LAW 658 (1938) (referring to the writ as "the most effectual
protector of the liberty of the subject that any legal system has ever devised").
3. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401 (1963).
4. See Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318, 326 (1867) (stating that
habeas jurisdiction extends to every "possible case of privation of liberty
contrary to the National Constitution, treaties, or laws").
5. See generally Alan K. Chen, Shadow Law: Reasonable
Unreasonableness, Habeas Theory, and the Nature of Legal Rules, 2 BUFF.
CRiM. L. REV. 535 (1999) (surveying recent limits imposed on habeas
availability); Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44
BUFF. L. REV. 381 (1996); Note, The Avoidance of Constitutional Questions
and the Preservation of Judicial Review: Federal Court Treatment of the New
Habeas Provisions, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1578 (1998).
6. See, e.g., Frank J. Remington, Restricting Access to Federal Habeas
Corpus: Justice Sacrificed on the Altars of Expediency, Federalism and
Deterrence, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 339 (1987-1988); Yale L.
Rosenberg, Kaddish for Federal Habeas Corpus, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 362
(1991); Jordan Steiker, Restructuring Post-Conviction Review of Federal
Constitutional Claims Raised By State Prisoners: Confronting the New Face of
Excessive Proceduralism, 1998 U. Cmi. LEGAL F. 315; Mark Tushnet & Larry
Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47
DUE L.J. 1 (1997); Robert Weisberg, A Great Writ While it Lasted, 81 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 9 (1990).
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be in actual "physical" custody, i.e., suffer bodily restraint such
as occurs with imprisonment.7
Contemporary America, however, faced with ever-
mounting prisoner populations, and the enormous associated
costs, is pursuing novel methods of social control that press the
envelope of the jurisprudence of custody in unprecedented
ways. One modern method will be examined here: the use of
information and its dissemination to exercise ongoing control
over ex-offenders after they fulfill their penal obligations. In
particular, the Article examines the nationwide network of
registration and community notification laws, which require
convicted sex offenders to provide identifying information to
law enforcement, and then facilitate the spread of such
information when offenders are released into the community.
The discussion here centers on how and why the laws operate
to satisfy the custody requirement.
After first surveying the manner in which the custody
requirement has been construed over time by the Court, the
Article examines the historic use of registration and
notification laws and the methods employed by states today to
achieve the avowed public safety benefits the laws are thought
to serve. Thereafter, several decisions of the sole federal
appellate court to address the issue, the Ninth Circuit, are
discussed, each concluding that sex offenders subject to
registration and notification failed to satisfy the habeas custody
jurisdictional requirement. The balance of the Article argues
against the analytic approach adopted by the Ninth Circuit,
one which places premium importance on the question of
whether one's physical movement is measurably compelled or
restrained by government action. Such an approach, it will be
argued, is contrary to the broader liberty-protecting purposes of
habeas, and underestimates the numerous tangible and
intangible ways in which registration and notification infringe
upon personal liberty. In short, the Article argues that habeas,
as it has for centuries, must evolve in a manner sensitive to
contemporary methods of social control, in this instance the
government's aggressive use of information to achieve control
beyond the walls of prison.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 20-38.
20001
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:147
I. "CUSTODY" THROUGH THE LENS OF HISTORY
The writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum8 traces its U.S.
statutory origins to the Judiciary Act of 1789, which conferred
on federal courts the authority to review the criminal
convictions of those prosecuted under federal law.9 Only in the
aftermath of the Civil War did Congress expressly grant the
federal judiciary power to issue writs in favor of those subject
to state criminal prosecutions. 10 However, dating back to its
common law origins," and throughout its extended statutory
8. When reference to the "Great Writ" is made, such reference typically
has as its object the writ ad subjiciendum, which guards against illegal
detention and commands government actors to produce the petitioner so that
the legality of the detention can be tested. See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4
Cranch) 75, 95 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.). Blackstone identified four other
historic forms of habeas: habeas corpus ad satisfaciendum, ad respondendum,
ad prosequendum, testificandum et deliberandum, and ad faciendum et
recipiendum. See Fay, 372 U.S. at 399-400 n.5 (citing 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIEs *129-32).
9. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82 (empowering
federal courts to inquire into the "cause of commitment" of federal prisoners).
10. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385-86 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994)). As a technical matter, in 1833 Congress allowed
petition by a select group of persons detained by state actors: federal officials.
Force Act of March 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 7, 4 Stat. 634-35. Similarly, in 1842,
Congress extended habeas protection to foreign nationals detained by states.
Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 257, 5 Stat. 539. In a recent article, Professor Eric
Freedman called into question the persistent assumption by the Supreme
Court and scholars alike that federal habeas initially applied only to those
detained by federal authorities. See Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas
Corpus: Part I, Just Because John Marshall Said It, Doesn't Make It So: Ex
parte Bollman and the Illusory Prohibition on the Federal Writ of Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners in the Judiciary Act of 1789, 51 ALA. L. REV. 531
(2000). Upon reviewing the ratification debates surrounding the Suspension
Clause and federal decisions from the area of the seminal Exparte Bollman, 8
U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807), where Chief Justice Marshall deemed federal
habeas unavailable to state prisoners, Freedman concludes that Section 14 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789 and common law authority provided federal courts
authority to issue habeas writs relative to state and federal prisoners alike.
See id.
11. As Professor Larry Yackle has observed, "[tlhe modem 'custody'
requirement has ancient roots, bearing a correlative relation to the function of
the writ in the seventeenth century-to secure the release of persons who were
wrongly confined. Applicants for the writ had to be in some form of 'custody'
from which they could be discharged." Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas
Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 999 (1985). Cases have also described the
common law origins of the writ. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,
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history here, federal habeas has required that a petitioner be in
"custody"12 in violation of the "Constitution or laws or treaties
of the United States"13 before habeas jurisdiction can attach.
This requirement applies to petitioners detained by state and
federal authorities alike,14 and must be satisfied as a threshold
jurisdictional matter at the time the petition is filed in federal
court.15
Although for decades federal courts narrowly, and quite
literally, 16 interpreted the "custody" requirement to mean
484 (1973) ("It is clear from the common-law history of the writ, that the
essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality
of that custody, and that the traditional function of the writ is to secure
release from illegal custody."); McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 136 (1934)
(stating that the common law fimction of writ is to test "the legality of the
detention of one in the custody of another").
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994 & Supp. 1998-99) (extending the right to "[a]
prisoner in custody under sentence" of a federal court); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)
(1994 & Supp. 1998-99) (extending the right to "a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court").
13. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a) (1994); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994
& Supp. 1998-99) (referencing the "Constitution or laws of the United States").
14. Id. The enabling provision for federal habeas jurisdiction is found in
28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (1994) (providing "[wirits of habeas corpus may be granted
by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions"). The states, in turn, have their
respective post-conviction provisions. See DONALD E. WILKES, JR., FEDERAL
AND STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF § 9-2 (1996); Clive A.
Stafford Smith & Remy Voisin Starns, Folly By Fiat: Pretending That Death
Row Inmates Can Represent Themselves in State Capital Post-Conviction
Proceedings, 45 LOY. L. REv. 55, 57 (1999). The focus here, however, is
exclusively on the federal habeas right available to state and federal prisoners
and its construction by federal courts.
15. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968). In addition, petitioners
must satisfy other requirements such as exhaustion of available state
remedies and timeliness. See 2 JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 22-24 (3d ed. 1998 & Supp.
1999); LARRY W. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES §§ 52-87 (1981 & Supp.
2000).
Habeas petitions are civil, collateral actions that are legally and
procedurally distinct from direct appeals in the criminal process, yet
nonetheless challenge the basis of criminal conviction and custody. See O'Neal
v. McAnich, 513 U.S. 432, 440 (1995); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310
(1989). Unlike a traditional civil action, however, with habeas "someone's
custody, rather then mere civil liability, is at stake." O'Neal, 513 U.S. at 440.
16. See, e.g., Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1885) (denying writ
sought by Navy officer who was confined to the territorial limits of the District
of Columbia, because restraint must involve "actual confinement or the
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actual physical restraint,17 a markedly more expansive view
emerged over time. Until the 1960s, for instance, it was well
accepted that government-sponsored restraints in the form of
bail18 or parole 19 did not satisfy the custody jurisdictional
requirement. In 1963, however, Jones v. Cunningham20
signaled the Court's willingness to conceive of custody in
broader terms, stating that "[hlistory, usage, and precedent can
leave no doubt that, besides physical imprisonment, there are
other restraints on a man's liberty, restraints not shared by the
public generally, which have been thought sufficient in the
English-speaking world to support the issuance of habeas
corpus."21 Habeas, according to the Jones Court, "is not now
and never has been a static, narrow, formalistic remedy; its
scope has grown to achieve its grand purpose-the protection of
individuals against erosion of their right to be free from
wrongful restraints upon their liberty. 2 2 Quite simply, habeas
should reach restraints, such as those accompanying parole in
Jones, that prevent a person from doing the "things which in
this country free men are entitled to do."23
present means of enforcing it"); Sibray v. United States, 185 F. 401, 403-04 (3d
Cir. 1911) ("The custody complained of must be actual and not constructive...
• [The court must] have a subject to act upon, which is the body of the relator
brought into court by the respondent."). But see Wolfe v. Johnson, 130 N.E.
286, 287 (N.Y. 1921) (Cardozo, J.) (construing the New York habeas writ
expansively to include "constructive custody" associated with bail).
17. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 709 (6th ed. 1990) (providing Latin
definition of habeas corpus as "[y]ou have the body"). For extended scholarly
treatments of the "custody" requirement, see 1 LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note
15, § 8, at 321-44; YACKLE, supra note 15, §§ 41-51, at 177-229; Yale L.
Rosenberg, The Federal Habeas Corpus Custody Decisions: Liberal Oasis or
Conservative Prop?, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 99 (1995); Frank W. Smith, Jr., Federal
Habeas Corpus: State Prisoners and the Concept of Custody, 4 U. RICH. L. REV.
1 (1969); Timothy C. Hester, Comment, Beyond Custody: Expanding Collateral
Review of State Convictions, 14 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 465 (1981); Thomas M.
Hitch, Comment, Federal Habeas Corpus: The Concept of Custody and Access
to Federal Court, 53 J. URB. LAW 61 (1975).
18. See, e.g., Stallings v. Splain, 253 U.S. 339 (1920).
19. See, e.g., Weber v. Squier, 315 U.S. 810 (1942).
20. 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
21. Id. at 240.
22. Id. at 243.
23. Id; accord Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Servs. Agency, 458
U.S. 502, 510 (1982) (stating that the custody requirement is satisfied when a
petitioner suffers "substantial restraints not shared by the public generally");
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1963) (stating that habeas functions "to
152 [Vol. 85:147
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Today, in keeping with this liberal construction, federal
courts consistently hold that in addition to civil or criminal
confinement,24 constraints associated with parole,25 probation,26
bail, 27  personal recognizance, 28  pendent consecutive
sentences, 29  suspended sentences, 30  halfway house
commitments, 31 community service,32 and community-based
alcohol treatment 33 satisfy the custody requirement. Inactive
and unattached reserve status in the military also satisfies this
requirement. 34 At the same time, courts have been reluctant to
entertain habeas challenges to convictions resulting in
compelled restitution,35 fines,36 and deprivations of various
provide a prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be
intolerable restraints"); 17A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 4262 (Supp. 2000) (stating that "any restraint on a
petitioner's liberty because of his conviction that is over and above what the
state imposes on the public generally will suffice" to satisfy the custody
requirement).
With its focus on the liberty-restraining consequences of unlawful
governmental action, habeas shares an originating purpose with the
constitutional guarantee of due process, also dating back to the Magna Carta.
See David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process as
Limits on Congress's Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2502
(1998).
24. See Winthrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993) (prison); Townsend v.
Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (jail); Brock v. Weston, 31 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 1994)
(special "civil" commitment facility for sexually violent predators).
25. See Jones, 371 U.S. at 242-43.
26. See Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 425 (9th Cir. 1978).
27. See Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 286 n.2 (1975).
28. See Justices of Boston Municipal Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 300
(1984); Hensley v. Municipal Court, San Jose-Milpitas Judicial Dist., 411 U.S.
345, 346 (1973).
29. See Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 67 (1968).
30. See Sammons v. Rodgers, 785 F.2d 1343, 1345 (5th Cir. 1986).
31. See Wottlin v. Fleming, 136 F.3d 1032, 1034 n.1 (5th Cir. 1998).
32. See Barry v. Bergen County Probation Dept., 128 F.3d 152, 161 (3d
Cir. 1997).
33. See Dow v. Circuit Court of the First Circuit, 995 F.2d 922, 923 (9th
Cir. 1993).
34. See Strait v. Laird, 406 U.S. 341,346 (1972).
35. See United States v. Kramer, 195 F.3d 1129, 1130 (9th Cir. 1999).
Similarly, judicially compelled payment of a child support arrearage, even
under the auspices of a county probation department, does not qualify as
custody. See Galbo v. Tirri, 972 F. Supp. 292, 293 (D.N.J. 1997). The Galbo
court elaborated as follows:
Galbo is not being forced to act or refrain from acting in any way,
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:147
licenses.37 In short, as habeas scholar Professor Larry Yackle
observes, the circumstances and conditions deemed to satisfy
the custody jurisdictional requirement lie along a "continuum"
of deprivations.38
A critical exception to this liberal stance in custody
jurisprudence concerns the claims of petitioners who, having
completed their sentences, remain subject to "collateral
consequences," the gamut of legal disabilities attaching to
convictions that can extend well beyond the period of
confinement or conditional release. 39 The issue has arisen in
other than to fulfill the terms of a court mandated civil judgment,
ordering child custody payments. The Court's use of the Probation
Department as the channel through which the payments should be
made imposes no restraint on Galbo.
Galbo is not on probation .... [H]e is not required to report to
any specific individual to allow monitoring of his activities. Nor is he
restrained from pursuing a given type of employment or from
occupying a particular residence. Galbo is not made to submit to
random drug tests or counseling. Thus, Galbo does not suffer under
any of the hallmarks of custody under probation.
Id. at 293-94.
36. See United States v. Watroba, 56 F.3d 28, 29 (6th Cir. 1995); Spring v.
Caldwell, 692 F.2d 994, 999 (5th Cir. 1982). But see Thistlethwaite v. City of
New York, 497 F.2d 339, 343 (2d Cir. 1974) (suggesting in dictum that a fine
already paid might suffice for habeas jurisdiction).
37. See Lefkowitz v. Fair, 816 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1987) (medical license);
Harts v. Indiana, 732 F.2d 95, 96 (7th Cir. 1984) (driver's license); Ginsberg v.
Abrams, 702 F.2d 48, 49 (2d Cir. 1983) (removal from judicial bench, loss of
right to practice law, and disqualification as real estate or insurance agent);
Harvey v. South Dakota, 526 F.2d 840, 841 (8th Cir. 1975) (exclusion from
certain professions and the right to bear arms); Furey v. Hyland, 395 F. Supp.
1356, 1360 (D.N.J. 1975) (concerning a medical license and the legal capacity
to hold public office); Whorley v. Brilhart, 359 F. Supp. 539, 541 (E.D. Va.
1973) (driver's license).
38. YACKLE, supra note 15, § 43, at 185 ("It may be that all the instances
in which the Court is prepared to find 'custody' have not yet been identified,
but it appears on the evidence to date that the cases can be arranged on a
continuum . . . . As a practical matter, in the absence of clear rules for
guidance... the best that can be proposed is a list of the decided cases and an
attempt to identify the cases that remain for decision.").
39. The literature on collateral consequences is voluminous and
expanding. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment:
Reflections on the Racial Uses of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895 (1999);
Walter M. Grant et al., The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction,
23 VAND. L. REV. 929 (1970); Kathleen M. Oliveras et al., The Collateral
Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A National Study of State Legal Codes 10
Years Later, 60 FED. PROBATION, September 1996, at 10; Note, The
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several of the Court's decisions, but two are of particular note.
In the first case, Carafas v. LaVallee,40 Carafas filed his habeas
petition while still incarcerated, yet was freed by the State of
New York by the time his petition was finally addressed by the
federal courts. 41 The Supreme Court was therefore faced with
the question of whether expiration of Carafas's sentence
nullified jurisdiction and rendered his federal habeas petition
moot.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Fortas concluded
as a threshold matter that the case was not moot, based on the
collateral consequences attaching to Carafas's predicate
convictions:
[ie cannot engage in certain businesses; he cannot serve as an
official of a labor union for a specified period of time; he cannot vote in
any election held in New York State; he cannot serve as a juror.
Because of these "disabilities or burdens [which] may flow from"
petitioner's conviction, he has "a substantial stake in the judgment of
conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence imposed on
him." On account of these "collateral consequences," the case is not
moot
2
The Court then added that the "substantial issue" was whether
the physical release of Carafas, by the time his habeas petition
reached the Court, in effect stripped the Court of jurisdiction.43
Answering in the negative, the Court emphasized that habeas
relief extended to those no longer in actual physical custody."
In light of the serious disabilities that Carafas would continue
to suffer as a result of his conviction, the Court concluded that
"[tihere is no need in the statute, the Constitution, or sound
jurisprudence for denying to petitioner his ultimate day in
court." 4 5
Disenfranchisement of Ex Felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and "The Purity" of
the Ballot Box, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300 (1989); Note, Civil Disabilities of
Felons, 53 VA. L. REV. 403 (1967).
40. 391 U.S. 234 (1968).
41 Id. at 236.
42. Id. at 237-38 (footnotes and citations omitted).
43. Id. at 238.
44. Id. at 239.
45. Id. As a consequence, the Court squarely renounced its decision in
Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960) (per curiam), which deemed moot a habeas
claim of petitioner who was imprisoned at time of filing, yet freed when his
petition was adjudicated.
20001
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:147
Some twenty years after Carafas, the Court decided
Maleng v. Cook.46 Maleng was a recidivist who sought habeas
relief for a 1958 conviction, the sentence for which had expired,
reasoning that the conviction enhanced his punishment in 1978
for a subsequent conviction.47 In a unanimous decision, the
Court declared that a petitioner is not in custody merely
because a predicate conviction carries the "possibility" of
enhancing a future sentence. 48 After acknowledging that since
1963 it had read the custody requirement to embrace more then
mere physical custody, the Court stated that it had "never held,
however, that a habeas petitioner may be 'in custody' under a
conviction when the sentence imposed for that conviction has
fully expired at the time his petition is filed."4 9 "Indeed," the
Court emphasized, "our decision in Carafas v. LaVallee
strongly implies to the contrary."50 The Court's custody finding
in Carafas rested
not on the collateral consequences of the conviction, but on the fact
that the petitioner had been in physical custody under the challenged
conviction at the time the petition was filed. The negative implication
of this holding is, of course, that once the sentence imposed for a
conviction has completely expired, the collateral consequences of that
conviction are not in themselves sufficient to render an individual "in
custody" for the purposes of a habeas attack upon it.
51
Noting that "almost all States have habitual offender
statutes," the Court held that a fully expired sentence cannot
satisfy the custody requirement, despite "the possibility that
the prior conviction will be used to enhance" a subsequent
46. 490 U.S. 488 (1989) (per curiam).
47. Id. at 489-90.
48. Id. at 490. The Court had no difficulty in concluding that the
petitioner was in custody on the basis of his 1978 imprisonment. Id. at 493.
The Court, however, "express[ed] no view on the extent to which the 1958
conviction itself may be subject to challenge in the attack upon the 1978
sentences which it was used to enhance." Id. at 494. Nevertheless, in the
wake of Maleng, lower courts have "uniformly read [Maleng] as consistent
with the view that federal habeas courts may review prior convictions relied
upon for sentence enhancement and grant appropriate relief." Custis v.
United States, 511 U.S. 485, 512 n.7 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting); see also
United States v. Clark, 203 F.3d 358, 364 (5th Cir. 2000) ("[Als long as the
habeas relief sought is framed as an attack on a present sentence, as to which
the prisoner is still 'in custody,' then the expired conviction used to enhance
that sentence may be challenged.").
49. Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 492.
156
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sentence. 52  To conclude -otherwise would "mean that a
petitioner whose sentence had completely expired could
nonetheless challenge the conviction for which it was imposed
at any time on federal habeas. This would read the 'in custody'
requirement out of the statute and be contrary to the clear
implications of the opinion in Carafas v. LaVallee."53
Taken together, the Court's custody jurisprudence makes it
clear that restraints short of physical detention can satisfy the
custody requirement. At the same time, however, the Court
has been reluctant to discern custody in situations where
petitioners have completed their formal sentences. Indeed,
although predicate convictions can be challenged when used to
enhance consecutive sentences currently being served,54 the
Court has been disinclined to recognize the lasting effects of
criminal convictions as a basis for habeas jurisdiction.55 This is
so despite the obvious inconsistency thereby created: that
collateral consequences can preserve habeas jurisdiction, once
established, against a claim of mootness, but do not suffice, in
and of themselves, in the absence of initial jurisdiction. 56 As
one treatise notes, "the collateral consequences [petitioners]
suffer may be burdensome, even debilitating, but in the Court's
eyes they do not justify extraordinary relief."57 In short,
although collateral consequences might suffice to avoid
mootness, it appears that "standing alone [they] are not enough
to initiate a habeas petition."58
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. Id.
54. See Garlotte v. Fordice, 515 U.S. 39, 47 (1995) (holding that
consecutive sentences must be conceived in "the aggregate," permitting
scrutiny of convictions associated with sentences that have already been
served).
55. See Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 117 n.111 (stating that "the Court
has not directly decided whether the custody requirement is met by collateral
consequences alone," but Carafas and Maleng "strongly suggest" and "support"
the contention that the requirement would not be satisfied).
56. See Note, Developments in the Law: Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 1038, 1077 (1970) (noting that "by refusing to consider the collateral
restraints themselves a custody, Carafas results in an apparent, arbitrary
distinction").
57. YACKLE, supra note 15, § 43, at 187.
58. Id. § 49, at 219 (emphasis in original); see also Ward v. Knoblock, 738
F.2d 134, 138-39 (6th Cir. 1984) ("The existence of collateral consequences...
may enable a petitioner who has fully served a sentence he wished to
challenge to avoid being dismissed on mootness grounds, but it will not suffice
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II. FEDERAL HABEAS AND MODERN SEX OFFENDER
REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION LAWS
It was against this backdrop that the Ninth Circuit
recently issued a trio of decisions addressing whether the
ongoing effects of registration and community notification,
experienced by sex offenders having completed their sentences,
satisfy the habeas "custody" requirement.5 9  After first
providing a brief overview of the history of registration and
notification laws, this section examines the results and
rationales of the court's decisions, addressing the laws in place
in Washington, California, and Oregon.
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF REGISTRATION AND NOTIFICATION
Criminal registration laws in particular trace their U.S
origins back to at least the 1930s, 60 with California, in 1947,
to satisfy the 'in custody' jurisdictional prerequisite unless, as in Carafas
itself, federal jurisdiction has already attached."); Tinder v. Paula, 725 F.2d
801, 803 (1st Cir. 1984) ("[A] sentence that has been fully served does not
satisfy the custody requirement of the habeas statute, despite the collateral
consequences that generally attend a criminal conviction.").
This paradox is evident in the Ninth Circuit's case law on sex offender
registration and notification laws. Compare Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d
1180, 1184 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that the laws do not satisfy habeas
custody requirement), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1081 (1999), with Wood v. Hall,
130 F.3d 373, 376 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997) (rejecting claim of mootness in part
because conviction would potentially subject petitioner to the laws).
In addition, in order to avoid mootness, it appears that only "legal"
collateral consequences qualify, those of a mandatory and statutory origin.
See Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 632 (1982) (suggesting that discretionary,
"non-statutory consequences" relating to parole violation do not suffice to
avoid mootness); see also YACKLE, supra note 15, § 49, at 220 (inferring that
the Court's "repetitive use of the adjective 'legal' in referring to collateral
consequences in the cases" suggests that "only legal effects will suffice"). As a
result, mootness may prevail if the petition relies solely "upon the moral
stigma of a criminal conviction and the social burdens imposed upon convicts
by the private community." Id. Professor Yackle concludes that "[ciomplaints
about official, legal effects of convictions are perhaps distinguishable from less
tangible, social consequences." Id. (emphasis in original).
59. See McNab v. Kok, 170 F.3d 1246, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam);
Henry v. Lungren, 164 F.3d 1240, 1241 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub. nom.
Henry v. Lockyer, 120 S. Ct. 397 (1999); Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1184.
60. See Note, Criminal Registration Ordinances: Police Control Over
Potential Recidivists, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 60, 61-64 (1954) [hereinafter
Registration Ordinances]. In 1934, Professor August Vollmer of the Berkeley
law faculty advocated "universal registration" of all persons, highlighting what
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implementing the nation's first registry dedicated exclusively to
sex offenders.61 A basic purpose of registration, as the New
Jersey Supreme Court put it in 1969, "is to alert the local police
department to the presence of persons convicted of crime. The
premise is that recidivism is a reality, and hence law
enforcement will be aided by an awareness of individuals whose
prior offenses reveal an added risk."62 Less direct, but no less
critical, the laws at their origin were conceived as means to
discourage criminals from locating in an area in the first place,
and as a ready basis for arrest should the registration
requirement not be met. As one early commentator observed,
[tlhe immediate objectives of these ordinances appeared to be the
incarceration or expulsion of undesirables, rather than the
registration of criminals. It was believed that the individuals affected
would move elsewhere to avoid registration. However, as more
jurisdictions adopted these ordinances, a convicted person would be
less able and less likely to escape registration by moving. Therefore,
the principal mode of evasion would tend to become a failure to
register with the consequent fulfillment of only the incarceration
objective.6 3
he saw as its manifold advantages. See Note, Universal Registration, 25 J. OF
CRIM. LAW, CRIM. & POL. SCI. 650, 650-52 (1934-1935). Two years later, the
Philadelphia City Council passed an ordinance dedicated exclusively to
persons convicted of crimes. Note, Criminal Registration Law, 27 J. OF CRIM.
LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 295, 295 (1936-1937). In Germany, criminal registration
laws date back to the 1860s. Mathieu Deflem, Surveillance and Criminal
Statistics, in 17 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS AND SOCIETY 149, 161 (Austin
Sarat & Susan S. Sibley eds., 1997).
The laws share a common pedigree with the eugenics and "signalment"
movements of the mid-late nineteenth century, products of the emerging
discipline of criminology and its effort to systematize crime control and
analysis. In 1880s Paris, for instance, Alphonse Bertillon spearheaded a
system of "anthropological signalment that measured the head, arms, feet,
and ears of criminal suspects, as well as scars and other identifying
characteristics. The police used these data to solve cases and corroborate the
identities of criminal suspects. See generally ALPHONSE BERTILLON,
SIGNALETIC INSTRUCTIONS (R.W. McClaughry ed., 1896).
6L See Elizabeth A. Pearson, Status and Latest Developments in Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Laws, in NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
SEX OFFENDER REGISTRIES 45 (U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics ed., 1998).
For an interesting discussion of how the justice system in effect subverted
California's registration law in the 1960s by commonly permitting sex
offenders to plead to crimes not requiring registration, see E.A. Riddle, Note,
Compulsory Registration: A Vehicle of Mercy Discarded, 3 CAL. W. L. REV. 195
(1967).
62. State v. Ulesky, 252 A.2d 720, 721 (N.J. 1969).
63. Registration Ordinances, supra note 60, at 63; see also id. at 104
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Over the decades, the courts, including the U.S Supreme
Court, have had occasion to address the constitutionality of
criminal registration laws. Most notably, in Lambert v.
California,64 the Supreme Court invalidated a Los Angeles
ordinance that made it unlawful for "any convicted person" to
fail to register with local authorities, reasoning that the
provision violated due process in the absence of "actual
knowledge of the duty to register or proof of the probability of
such knowledge .. . ."65 With the notice requirement satisfied,
however, registration laws have consistently withstood
constitutional challenge. 66
("Local authorities also use the ordinance to expel 'undesirables' from the
jurisdiction by suspending sentence upon condition that they leave town ....
The pattern of selective prosecution which was discerned in some communities
enables local authorities to use the ordinances as an additional effective
harassing weapon.").
64. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
65. Id. at 229.
66. See, e.g., Reyes v. United States, 258 F.2d 774, 781 (9th Cir. 1958)
(upholding 18 U.S.C. § 1407 (1956), requiring registration of persons convicted
of narcotics offenses who seek to enter or leave the United States); United
States v. Bologna, 181 F. Supp. 706, 708-09 (S.D. Cal. 1960) (same).
Judicial concern has surfaced, however, over locally-initiated registration
ordinances, with the specter of state legislative preemption playing a central
role. In State v. Ulesky, 252 A.2d 720 (N.J. 1969), for instance, the Borough of
Belmar, New Jersey enacted an ordinance requiring those convicted within
the past ten years of a "crime or a narcotics violation" to register with police
within twenty-four hours of entry. Id. at 721. Such persons were required to
submit a written statement under oath and forced to carry an identification
card furnished by the authorities, the latter containing a photograph of the
registrant as well as address and offense-related information. Id. Ulesky was
arrested for failing to comply with the ordinance and eventually appealed to
the New Jersey Supreme Court. Id.
The Ulesky court reversed, concluding that the state had preempted the
field when it required registration solely of narcotics offenders. Id. at 722-23.
"The Legislature having considered the subject and having acted with such
particularity, there is reason to believe the Legislature was unwilling to say
that other convictions warranted such restraint upon the right of the
individual merely to be or to move about." Id. at 722. The court added:
Perhaps, too, it may be that the cumulative burden of legislation by
all municipalities could exceed what due process of law would permit
if it should appear the same public need could be met with a more
modest burden by a statewide program or a statute specifying some
uniform local legislative approach.
It seems to us, therefore, that the subject is such that, while it
does not foreclose the delegation of the State's police power to
municipalities, it nonetheless advises against that course except
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Like "sexual psychopath" laws, also on the books since the
1930s,67 registration laws existed in relative desuetude until
the mid-1990s. However, with the brutal rape and murder of
seven-year-old Megan Kanka in 1994, and the New Jersey
Legislature's lightning-quick response, 68 Americans awakened
under statutory guidance and restraint. For example, the
Legislature, if it wished municipalities to deal with the matter, might
well specify the particular crimes which it believes to be so suggestive
of recidivism as to warrant the burden of registration, or prescribe a
time limit upon the conviction, or require reciprocal recognition of
registration among municipalities.
Id. at 723. The Ulesky court, therefore, did not premise its holding on any per
se objection to registration laws, but rather on the preemption concerns and
the perceived benefits of uniformly applicable registratibn laws. See id.
(suggesting a "central agency... as a more palatable alternative to successive
appearances at each local police headquarters").
The California Supreme Court reached essentially the same result in
Abbott v. Los Angeles, 349 P.2d 974 (Cal. 1960). Abbott essentially invalidated
a Los Angeles criminal registration ordinance, using as an "example" of the
California Legislature's intent to occupy the field its statute that targeted sex
offenders alone for registration. Id. at 982. This narrow focus, the court
reasoned, "leads unerringly to the conclusion that the Legislature has adopted
a clear policy based upon the dual presumptions that certain criminals are
recidivistic and others are not, and that certain types of crime require
registration and others do not." Id; see also id. at 983 (inferring a legislative
determination "that criminal identification together with maintenance and
dissemination of criminal statistics is best handled at [the) state level").
67. The psychopath laws were directed toward securing involuntary civil
institutional commitment of sex offenders, unlike registration laws, which
seek community-based control of offenders. For discussions of the historic and
contemporary uses of commitment laws, see Samuel J. Brakel & James L.
Cavenaugh, Of Psychopaths and Pendulums: Legal and Psychiatric Treatment
of Sex Offenders in the United States, 30 N.M. L. REV. 69 (2000); Eric S. Janus
& Nancy H. Walbeck, Sex Offender Commitments in Minnesota: A Descriptive
Study of Second Generation Commitments, 18 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 343 (2000). In
1997, the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed a modern-day incarnation of the
sexual psychopath laws when it rejected ex post facto, double jeopardy, and
substantive due process challenges to Kansas's Sexually Violent Predator Act,
which permits putative civil commitment of sex offenders after their release
from prison. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997). In contrast
to the avowed therapeutic mission of earlier commitment laws, the modern
regimes are unabashedly predicated on incapacitation. See Janus & Walbeck,
supra, at 344 (noting the "fundamental shift in the espoused justification for
sex offender commitments": "Second generation sex offender commitments are
explicitly aimed at incapacitation.").
68. See E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1081-82 (3d Cir. 1997)
(recounting the rapid passage of "Megan's Law" in the New Jersey
Legislature); see also Robert Hanley, 'Megan's Law' is Questioned as
Injunction is Extended, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1996, at B6 (recounting how
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to the scourge of sex offenders in their communities 69 and to the
appeal of registration. Today, all fifty states, the District of
Columbia, and the federal government require registration of
convicted sex offenders. 70 For its part, the federal government
is seeking to develop a nationwide registry, which, in President
Clinton's words, is designed to "keep track of [sex offenders]-
not just in a single state, but wherever they go, wherever they
move, so that parents and police have the warning they need to
protect our children.... Deadly criminals don't stay within
state lines, so neither should law enforcement's tools to stop
them."7 1 Unlike earlier registration laws, which often required
registrants to carry special cards identifying them as "convicted
persons,"72 modern sex offender laws mandate that individuals
provide specified information to police, verify such information
at designated intervals, and remain registered for at least ten
years.73 Like the old laws, however, eligible offenders 74 who fail
legislators rushed the bill through session, with little in the way of hearings,
in response to pleas of Megan's parents and the bill's advocates).
69. See, e.g., ADAM SAMPSON, AcTS OF ABUSE: SEX OFFENDERS AND THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 124 (1994) (noting that the "vehemence of the
hatred for sex offenders is unmatched by attitudes to any other offenders");
Mimi Hall, A Furor Brews Over Release of Sex Offenders, USA TODAY, Aug. 17,
1994, at A3 (describing marked upsurge in public concern over sex offenders
and legislative efforts in response); David van Biema, Burn Thy Neighbor,
TIME, July 26, 1993, at 58 (noting that the "mass culture and some experts"
refer to sex offenders as "irredeemable monsters").
70. See Andy Newman, Megan, Her Law and What It Spawned, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 1996, at N.J. 18.
71. Brian McGrory, Clinton Sets Tracking of Sex Offenders, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 25, 1996, at Al; see also Ron Fournier, Clinton Signs Law On Sex
Offenders, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, May 18, 1996, at 12 (quoting President
Clinton: "If you dare to prey on our children, the law will follow you wherever
you go-state to state, town to town.").
72. See Registration Ordinances, supra note 60, at 77-78. This distinction
between the old and new regimes, however, will not likely persist. Delaware,
for instance, now requires that sex offender registrants have a "Y" emblazoned
on their automobile drivers' permits. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 2718(e)
(1998). Similarly, Arizona, Michigan, and Texas now require registrants to
acquire drivers' licenses or other official personal identification cards with
photographs to facilitate their ongoing identification. See ARIZ. STAT. § 13-
3821(H) (1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.725(a)(6), (7) (2000); TEM. CODE
CRIM. PROC. arts. 42.016, 62.065 (2000). The Arizona and Texas laws
mandate that the cards be renewed on an annual basis, in contrast to the
lengthier renewal periods for non-registrants. See ARIZ. STAT. § 13-3821(H);
TEX CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 42.016, 62.065.
73. Congress has set forth certain de minimis requirements with which
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to comply with registration requirements risk independent
prosecution, often at the felony level.75
More recently, once again under intense federal pressure,
jurisdictions have acted to ensure that information pertaining
to registrants is disseminated throughout communities. 76 At
present, registrants' information is disseminated by numerous
means, including telephone "hot-lines,"77 Internet web sites,7 8
and active disclosure by law enforcement by means of door-to-
door visits, leaflets, mailings and community meetings.7 9
states must comply if they are to avoid losing ten percent of their federal law
enforcement funding. For instance, federal law designates minimal standards
as to which offenders must register, the information that must be provided
(name, address, fingerprints, and a photo), and the period of registration (ten
years). 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)-(b) (Supp. 1994).
74 See Wayne A. Logan, A Study in "Actuarial Justice': Sex Offender
Classification and Procedure, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 593 (2000) (discussing the
methods currently employed in jurisdictions to classify offenders for purposes
of registration and notification).
75. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11-56.835 (1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3824
(Supp. 1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.729 (West 2000); MINN. STAT. § 243.166
(2000); WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.130(10) (2000).
76. As with registration, jurisdictions failing to develop systems to
"release relevant information that is necessary to protect the public" risk the
loss of significant federal law enforcement funds. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e) (2000).
77. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.4(a)(3) (West 1999); N.Y. CORRECT.
LAW § 168-p (McKinney 2000).
78. Several organizations maintain web sites that permit links to
jurisdictions currently making use of the Internet for notification purposes.
See, e.g., Megan's Law in All 50 States, available at http'//www.klaaskids.
org/pg-legmeg.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2000); Nationwide Registries and
Links, available at www.parentsformeganslaw.com (last visited Sept. 24,
2000). See generally Paul Zielbauer, Posting of Sex Offender Registries on Web
Sets off Both Praise and Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2000, at B1 (surveying
rapid proliferation of state web sites and the concerns raised). The sites,
which customarily contain such identifying information on registrants as
home addresses, offense information, and mug shots, have proved enormously
popular. See Melissa Moore, New Sex Offender Site Can't Tell Entire Story,
THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), at 9B, May 10, 2000 (noting that in the
two weeks since being initiated Louisiana's new site had nearly one million
visitors), available at http'/www.theadvocate.com/opinion/story.asp?storyid=
2110 (last visited Sept. 24, 2000).
79. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4121(a)(1) (Supp. 1998) ("Methods
of notification may include door-to-door appearances, mail, telephone,
newspapers or notices to schools and licensed day care facilities within the
community, or any combination thereof."). See generally DEVON B. ADAMS,
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF STATE SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY
DISSEMINATION PROCEDURES: UPDATE 1999 (1999) (describing a variety of
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Louisiana, unique among the states, requires that registrants
themselves carry out notification by means of mail and
advertising, at their own expense.80 In the court's discretion,
Louisiana registrants can also be forced to wear special
identifying clothing, post signs at their residences or affix
bumper stickers to their cars to provide "adequate" notice.81
More generally, courts nationwide have liberally construed
statutory language relating to permissible dissemination
methods, consistent with the perceived public safety benefit of
notification laws. 82
Under federal law, dissemination of registrants'
information is required.8 3 The information disseminated varies
among jurisdictions but typically includes, in addition to
registrants' names and offense-related information, photos,
home (and sometimes work) addresses, identifying physical
characteristics, and date of birth.8 4 The geographic scope of
notification methods).
80. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:542(b) (Supp. 2000).
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Byron M. v. City of Whittier, 46 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1039, 1042
(C.D. Cal. 1998) (interpreting "advise the public" language in the California
statutory law to allow the use of the media); State v. Wilkinson, No. 82,347,
2000 WL 992105, at *9 (Kan. 2000) (permitting the use of an Internet web-site
on the basis of a statutory requirement that registrants' information shall be
"open to inspection").
83. The Guidelines associated with notification underscore the
government's determination in this regard:
[A] state cannot comply with the Act by releasing registration
information only to law enforcement agencies, to other governmental
or non-governmental agencies or organizations, to prospective
employers, or to the victims of registrants' offenses. States also
cannot comply by having purely permissive or discretionary authority
for officials to release registration information. Information must be
released to members of the public as necessary to protect the public
from registered offenders.
Megan's Law, Final Guidelines for the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against
Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, as Amended, 64 Fed.
Reg. 572, 581 (1999). The Guidelines, however, are also at pains to emphasize
that the federal requirements represent "a floor for state programs, not a
ceiling" relative to the gamut of eligible offenders, the type of information
collected, and the means and scope of information disseminated to
communities. Id. at 572-79.
84. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20-21(3) (Supp. 1999); ALASKA STAT. ANN. §
18.65.087(b) (Michie 1998); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 846E-3 (Michie Supp.
1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4907 (1995 & Supp. 1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-
3-490 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-106(f) (West 1997 &
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dissemination and the persons targeted to receive the
information can vary. In many states, information on all
statutorily eligible offenders is made available, without
variation in geographic scope or selectivity of recipients.85 In
others, risk determinations are made by police or other
authorities, outcomes that determine the duration of
registration and the spread of information, subject to statutory
or administrative guidelines.86
Registration and notification are thought to advance two
primary purposes. First, notification can heighten community
awareness of the presence of registrants, and their offending
histories, thereby permitting citizens to undertake efforts to
guard against possible future victimization.87  Second,
registrants, conscious that law enforcement and the public are
mindful of their whereabouts, will themselves be deterred from
committing additional sex crimes should they be so inclined.
88
Supp. 1999).
85. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 290 (West 1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 54-250 to 54-261 (West Supp. 1999); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/2 to /12,
152/105 to /130 (West Supp. 2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-12-4 (Michie Supp.
2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-4902 to 22-4909 (1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
15:546 (West Supp. 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 28.722 to 28.730 (West
Supp. 2000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, §§ 581-589 (West Supp. 2000); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 23-3-400 to -460, 23-3-520 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 40-39-101 to -110 (1997 & Supp. 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
27-21.5 (Supp. 2000).
86. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3825 (West Supp. 1999); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6, §§ 178D, 178K (West 1999); MINN. STAT. § 244.052
(2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to :7-11. (West 1999); N.Y. CORRECT. LAw §§
168 1-n (McKinney 1999); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 181.585 to .588 (1997) (amended
1999); TEX. CRIM PROC. arts. 62.02, 62.03 (1999); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
4.24.550 (West Supp. 1999).
87. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20-20 (1999) ("[The Legislature finds that
releasing information about criminal sex offenders to law enforcement
agencies and, providing access to or releasing such information.., to the
general public, will further the primary government interest of protecting
vulnerable populations and in some instances the public, from potential
harm."); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.02(A)(1) (Anderson 1999) ("If the public
is provided adequate notice and information ... members of the public and
communities can develop constructive plans to prepare themselves and their
children. .. ."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-101(b)(6) (1999) ("To protect the
safety and general welfare of the people of this state, it is necessary to provide
for continued registration of sexual offenders and for the public release of
specified information regarding sexual offenders.").
88. See, e.g., Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 389 (N.J. 1995) ("[The liaws not
only protect against crime but deter it: both for the potential offender.., as
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In addition to enjoying enormous public and political
support, registration and notification laws have proved
virtually impregnable to direct constitutional challenge.
Appeals premised on the Cruel and Unusual Punishment,
Double Jeopardy, and Ex Post Facto Clauses have consistently
met defeat on the rationale that the laws do not impose
"punishment" for constitutional purposes. 89  Less common
claims sounding in equal protection,90 the right to travel,91 and
the Fourth Amendment 92 have also proved unsuccessful.9 3
Most recently, procedural due process challenges have been
rejected as well, on the reasoning that registration and
notification do not jeopardize a protectible liberty interest.94
well as for those who might otherwise commit a first offense but for the
potential impact .... ").
89. See, e.g., Femedeer v. Haun, Nos. 99-4082, 99-4093, 2000 WL 1217746,
at *5 (10th Cir. 2000); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1093 (9th Cir. 1997);
Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1285 (2d Cir. 1997); Spencer v. O'Connor, 707
N.E.2d 1039, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Snyder v. State, 912 P.2d 1127, 1132
(Wyo. 1996).
90. See, e.g., Artway v. Attorney Gen., 81 F.3d 1235, 1267-68 (3d Cir.
1996); Opinion of Justices to the Senate, 668 N.E.2d 738, 755-56 (Mass. 1996).
91. See, e.g., State v. Cameron, 916 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Az. Ct. App. 1996).
92. See, e.g., Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1558 (9th Cir. 1995); Rowe v.
Burton, 884 F. Supp. 1372, 1381 (D. Alaska 1994).
93. To the very limited extent that courts have found fault with the laws,
such concern almost always, as a rule, relates to notification, not registration.
See, e.g., Rowe v. Burton, 884 F. S.pp. 1372, 1380 (D. Alaska 1994)
(concluding that the retroactive imposition of notification, but not registration
alone, violates the Ex Post Facto Clause); State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1041
(Kan. 1996) (same); State v. Babin, 637 So. 2d 814, 824 (La. Ct. App. 1994)
(same).
94. See, e.g., Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466, 482 (6th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 120 S. Ct. 1554 (2000); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1094 (9th
Cir. 1997); Lanni v. Engler, 994 F. Supp. 849, 855 (E.D. Mich. 1998); Doe v.
Kelly, 961 F. Supp. 1105, 1112 (W.D. Mich. 1997); State v. Wilkinson, No.
82,347, 2000 WL 992105, at *8 (Kan. 2000); People v. Logan, 705 N.E.2d 152,
160-61 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). But see Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 468
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (concluding that registration and notification implicate a
liberty interest requiring due process protection); Doe v. Attorney Gen., 715
N.E.2d 37, 43-45 (Mass. 1999) (same); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 411 (N.J.
1995) (same); Noble v. Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, 964 P.2d
990, 997 (Or. 1997) (same).
The judicial distinction drawn between registration and notification,
discussed supra in note 93, is evident in the due process realm as well.
Compare Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 718 (Minn. 1999) (permitting the
compelled registration of an offender charged with but not convicted of a
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The Supreme Court, for its part, has passed up several
opportunities for review.95
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT ADDRESSES THE "CUSTODY QUESTION"
Because of the recency of registration and notification
laws, habeas claims brought by petitioners challenging their
underlying convictions are only now making their way to
federal courts. The sole exception to this decisional vacuum at
the appellate level is the Ninth Circuit, which over the last two
years has rendered three decisions on the question of whether
the consequences of registration and notification satisfy the
habeas custody requirement.
In the first and most important decision, Williamson v.
Gregoire,96 the petitioner was convicted in Washington State of
child molestation and sentenced to twenty-seven months in
prison and one year of community confinement.97  After
fulfilling these conditions in 1994, Williamson became subject
to the registration and community notification laws of
Washington. 98 Williamson was therefore required to register
with the county sheriff where he resided, and provide the
sheriff with his name, address, date and place of birth, place of
employment, crime of conviction, date and place of conviction,
aliases, fingerprints, social security number, and a
statutorily enumerated sex offense requiring registration), with In re Risk
Level Determination of C.M., 578 N.W.2d 391, 399 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998)
(precluding notification under similar circumstances).
For a discussion of the due process concerns raised by notification laws
more generally, see Wayne A. Logan, Liberty Interests in the Preventive State:
Procedural Due Process and Sex Offender Community Notification Laws, 89 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1167 (1999).
95. See, e.g., Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 120 S. Ct. 1554 (2000); Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1007 (1998); Doe v. Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1122 (1998); E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077 (3d
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1081 (1998).
96. Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1181 (9th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 1081 (1999).
97. See Brief for Respondent-Appellee at 2, Williamson v. Gregoire, 151
F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 1998) (No. 97-35699).
98. Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1181. Washington was the first U.S.
jurisdiction to institute a sex offender notification law (as opposed to
registration alone), in 1990, predating the high-profile legislative efforts in
New Jersey. See Pearson, supra note 61, at 45.
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photograph.99  Washington law further required that
Williamson thereafter verify his address on an annual basis by
responding to a certified letter, return receipt requested, sent
every year by the sheriff to his specified address.100
If Williamson intended to move, he was required to notify
the sheriff in advance, and, if moving to a new county, to
provide notice to the new sheriff and register there anew within
twenty-four hours of arrival; if moving out of state, he was also
required to notify authorities in the new state prior to
moving. 1°1 If he wished to enroll at an institution of higher
learning, Williamson was required to notify the sheriff of his
intent, and the sheriff in turn was to notify the school's law
enforcement officials.' 0 2 On a more personal level, Williamson
was obliged to request permission to change his name, and, if
allowed, was then required to update his registration
information with the sheriff.10 3 Finally, because he had been
convicted of a class A felony, 1°4 Williamson remained subject to
these constraints for life, subject to possible judicial review
after ten years. 0 5  If he failed to satisfy any of the
aforementioned requirements, he would be subject to
prosecution for a class C felony.10 6
99. Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1181 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.130
(1), (3)(a) (1998)).
100. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.135 (1)(a) (1998)).
101. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.130(5)(a) (1998)).
102. Id. (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.130(1) (1998)).
103. Id. The court merely noted that Williamson was required to apprise
authorities of his name change, neglecting to mention that, because of his sex
offender registrant status, the request would be screened beforehand by
authorities:
No sex offender under the requirement to register under this section
at the time of application shall be granted an order changing his or
her name if the court finds that doing so will interfere with legitimate
law enforcement interests, except that no order shall be denied when
the name change is requested for religious or legitimate cultural
reasons or in recognition of marriage or dissolution of marriage.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.130(7) (1998).
104. See § 9A.44.083(2) (identifying first degree child molestation as a
"class A" felony).
105. See § 9A.44.140(3). To be successful, Williamson would be required to
(1) establish that he had not been convicted of "any new offenses" during the
ten consecutive years since his initial registration and (2) prove by "clear and
convincing evidence" that his continued registration would not "serve the
purposes" of the registration and notification laws. Id.
106. See § 9A.44.130 (10), (11).
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Pursuant to the Washington community notification
scheme, Williamson would be assigned to one of three "risk
level classifications .... .. 107 As in other jurisdictions using a
discretionary tier scheme, the classification would determine
the extent and nature of notification, consistent with the need
"to protect the public and counteract the danger created by the
particular offender."108 For those in level I, information is
shared with local law enforcement and "may" be disclosed to
victims, witnesses, and any one near where the registrant will
reside; for level II, information may also be disclosed to
organizations that care for children, women or "vulnerable
adults," and neighbors and community groups as deemed
warranted; for level III, information may also be released to
"the public at large."109
The trial court concluded that Williamson was "in custody"
at the time he filed his habeas petition. 110 However, the court
ultimately denied the writ because Williamson failed to
properly raise his constitutional claims in state court, resulting
in procedural default.11'
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit addressed what it called "a
novel question of law": whether Washington's registration and
community notification scheme subjected Williamson to
custody for habeas jurisdictional purposes. 112 The court began
its analysis by citing what it saw as the "clear limitation" of the
Supreme Court's habeas jurisprudence: "[Olnce the sentence
107. See § 4.24.550(4).
108. See § 4.24.550(1); see also id. at § 4.24.550(2) ('The extent of the public
disclosure of relevant and necessary information shall be rationally related to:
(a) The level of risk posed by the offender to the community; (b) the locations
where the offender resides, expects to reside, or is regularly found; and (c) the
needs of the affected community members for information to enhance their
individual and collective safety.").
109. § 4.24.550(3).
110. Williamson v. Gregoire, 151 F.3d 1180, 1182 (9th Cir. 1998), cert.
denied, 525 U.S. 1081 (1999).
111. Id.
112. Id; see also id. at 1183 ("We are unaware of any other case that has
analyzed the 'in custody' requirement as it relates to a similar state law. Nor
do we find the precedents interpreting this phrase so closely analogous as to
be controlling."). Four years before, however, yet another Ninth Circuit panel
addressed whether a habeas petitioner's involuntary civil commitment
pursuant to Washington's "Sexually Violent Predators Act" satisfied the
custody requirement. See Brock v. Weston, 31 F.3d 887, 888 (9th Cir. 1994).
The panel unanimously concluded in the affirmative. Id. at 890.
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imposed for a conviction has completely expired, the collateral
consequences of that conviction are not themselves sufficient to
render an individual 'in custody.... "113 Thus, the court
reasoned, "the boundary that limits the 'in custody'
requirement is the line between a 'restraint on liberty' and a
'collateral consequence of a conviction."'1 14
In making this determination, the court inferred that the
Supreme Court's decisions finding a restraint on liberty "rely
heavily on the notion of a physical sense of liberty-that is,
whether the legal disability in question somehow limits the
putative habeas petitioner's movement."115 The court bolstered
its inference with an earlier Ninth Circuit decision holding that
mandatory attendance at an alcohol treatment program
qualified as custody because it required the petitioner's
"'physical presence at a particular place."'116 Applying this
physicality test, the court rejected the argument that
registration and notification combined to create a custodial
situation:
The sex offender registration and notification provisions apply to
Williamson whether he stays in the same place or whether he moves.
Indeed, even if Williamson never leaves his house, he must still verify
his address with the sheriff every year. The Washington sex offender
law does not require Williamson even to personally appear at a
sheriffs office to register; registration can be accomplished by mail.
Thus, the law neither targets Williamson's movement in order to
impose special requirements, nor does it demand his physical
presence at any time or place. Furthermore, the law does not specify
any place in Washington or anywhere else where Williamson may not
go.
117
The court did acknowledge that the law might "chill"
Williamson's freedom to travel, insofar as it required him to
apprise law enforcement in advance, and raised the specter of
additional notification when he moved; these effects, however,
were "purely subjective."1 18 Moreover, the court reasoned, the
"registration requirements involved in moving are not much
113. Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488,
492 (1992) (per curiam)).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. (quoting Dow v. Circuit Court of the First Circuit, 995 F.2d 922,
923 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)).
117. Id. at 1184 (citation omitted).
118. Id.
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more severe than those involved in not moving."119 In short,
the constraints lacked "the discernible impediment to
movement that typically satisfies the 'in custody'
requirement." 12
0
Next, the court dismissed the contention that the ongoing
threat of criminal prosecution, triggered if Williamson failed to
satisfy the registration requirements, satisfied the custody
requirement. 121 The court reasoned that while of course such a
prosecution, if successful, "might very well limit his movement,
for example, through incarceration," such an outcome was
entirely contingent on Williamson's willingness to follow the
law.122 In this sense, the registration law was analogous to
restitution orders, which the court noted are consistently
deemed insufficient to satisfy the custody requirement.
123
Finally, the court looked to prior Ninth Circuit case law
concerning an unsuccessful Ex Post Facto Clause challenge to
the Washington registration and notification laws, which
characterized the laws as 'regulatory and not punitive." 124
This regulatory character, although not dispositive of the
custody inquiry,12 bolstered the court's conclusion "that the
registration and notification provisions are more analogous to a
loss of the right to vote or own firearms, or the loss of a
professional license, rather than probation or parole."126
Several months after Williamson, another Ninth Circuit
panel addressed whether California's law, which requires
lifetime registration with annual verification, satisfied the
119. Id.
120. Id. ("I]he loss of a driver's license amounts to a much greater
limitation on one's freedom of movement than does the Washington sex
offender law, but the former does not satisfy the 'in custody' requirement
either.").
121. Id.
122. Id.; cf. McDonald v. Matin County Sheriff, No. 98-16144, 1999 WL
390991, at *1 (9th Cir. May 25, 1999) (rejecting a habeas claim on its merits
brought by a California registrant successfully prosecuted for failure to
register).
123. Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1184.
124. Id. (citing Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1093 (9th Cir. 1997)).
125. See id. (stating that Russell "is not directly controlling, of course,
because the 'in custody' requirement may be satisfied by restraints other than





custody requirement. In Henry v. Lungren,127 the court rejected
the claim that the California regime amounted to "perpetual
'custody,'" finding the reasoning of Williamson controlling.128
The Henry court characterized the differences between the two
jurisdictions' laws as "minimal"; although California law
required that offenders register in person (as opposed to by
means of mail), the constraints did not "constitute the type of
severe, immediate restraint on physical liberty" required to
establish custody.129 As a result, the regime was "merely a
collateral consequence of conviction," not in itself sufficient to
satisfy the custody requirement. 130
In March 1999, a third Ninth Circuit panel addressed the
custody question, this time in regard to Oregon law. In a per
curiam decision relying on Williamson and Henry, the court in
McNab v. Kok 131 also found custody to be lacking. 132 According
to the McNab court, "[1]ike their counterparts in California and
Washington, sex offenders subject to registration in Oregon are
free to move to a new place of residence so long as they notify
law enforcement officials of their new address."133
The Ninth Circuit's decisions in Williamson, Henry, and
McNab, the only appellate decisions to date on the relation of
habeas to the modern wave of sex offender laws, 134 evince a
127. 164 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub. nom. Henry v. Lockyer,
120 S. Ct. 397 (1999).
128. Id. at 1242.
129. Id. In actuality, the Washington and California laws do differ in
significant ways. In Washington, registration information is disseminated by
means of active notification effectuated by local law enforcement based on
discretionary risk assessments. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.550 (2000). In
California, statutory law mandates which offenders are subject to registration
and notification, and registrants' information is spread primarily by means of
an "access" system, whereby community members obtain information through
a CD-ROM or a "900" telephone number. CAL. PENAL CODE § 290.4 (1999).
But see § 290(m) (2000) (allowing police to carry out affirmative community
notification when they "reasonably suspect" that a "child or other person may
be at risk").
130. Henry, 164 F.3d at 1242.
131. 170 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
132. Id. at 1247.
133. Id.
134. At the time of this writing, one trial court, the Northern District of
Ohio, has also addressed the question of whether registration and notification
satisfy the custody requirement. See Thomas v. Morgan, 109 F. Supp. 2d 763
(N.D. Ohio 2000). Citing Williamson, the court held that the classification of
the petitioner as a "sexual predator," triggering Ohio's most extensive
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notably narrow conception of custody: one asking whether a
petitioner's actual physical "movement" is measurably
compelled or restrained. 135 As discussed in Part III, such a
view is both inconsistent with the broader purposes of habeas
and out of step with modern methods of social control, which in
contrast to past methods, place premium importance on the
powerful role that information can play in affecting control
beyond the reach of prison walls.
III. INFORMATION AS A MEANS OF SOCIAL CONTROL:
OF "VIRTUAL PILLORIES" AND THE EMERGING
"SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY"
Given the trajectory of the Supreme Court's increasingly
liberal custody jurisprudence, with its benchmark criterion of
whether the petitioner suffers "restraints not shared by the
public generally,"136 the trio of Ninth Circuit cases discussed
above represent starkly hidebound outcomes. Although the
Ninth Circuit may have been the first tribunal to contemplate
the relation between federal habeas and what might be called
"informational sanctions," it will not likely be the last given the
huge number of registrants who, having exhausted avenues of
direct relief, will now turn to the federal courts for habeas
collateral relief. This part discusses why the Ninth Circuit's
view lacks merit and explores the need for a broader conception
of "custody" in the emerging era of social control and penal
policy, which increasingly places premium importance on
information and it use.
A. THE EMERGING BRAVE NEW PENAL WORLD
For some time now, Americans have wrestled with a basic
dilemma: they at once wish to exercise control over record
numbers of criminal offenders, yet they do not wish to shoulder
registration and notification conditions, did not create a custodial situation.
Id. at 767-68.
135. Close examination of Henry and McNab makes it unclear whether the
respective panels were focusing on the effects of both registration and
notification, because express mention is made only of registration. The
California laws at issue in Henry, however, subject all statutorily eligible sex
offenders to compulsory notification. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 290, 290.4
(West 1999). The Oregon law at issue in McNab subjects all eligible offenders
to a review by a state agency, which determines whether notification is
warranted, and, if so, the degree. See OR. REV. STAT. § 181.586 (1999).
136. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240 (1963).
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the associated enormous financial costs. 137 This dilemma, in
turn, has been aggravated by an abiding frustration over the
perceived ineffectiveness of traditional correctional efforts, as
manifest in high recidivism rates and the view that prisons
serve as little more than "schools for crime."138 These factors
have spurred a philosophic and programmatic re-alignment in
American penology, and public sentiment toward corrections
more generally. 139 As one commentator recently noted: "An
unusual thing is happening in the world of punishment.
Different forms of punishment are starting to appear that
challenge conventional notions of what punishment is all
about."140
One crucial outgrowth of this evolution has been the
increased use of information to exercise control over offenders
outside the correctional setting, at significant cost-savings. The
137. See, e.g., Dick Foster, Colorado Prisons Bursting at Seams: Inmate
Population Threatens State Funds for Education, Health, Other Pressing
Needs, DENVER ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Jan. 17, 2000, at 4A; Mark Tatge,
Counties Feel Pinch of Rising Jail Costs: Tougher Sentences Add to Local Tabs,
THE PLAIN DEALER (CLEVELAND), Aug. 14, 1999, at 1A; Jack Wardlaw,
Hainkel Says Jail Costs Are Shackling the State: Judiciary Committee Will
Meet to Discuss It, TIMES-PICAYUNE (NEW ORLEANS), Feb. 8, 2000, at A2.
138. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1998 Table 2.16 (1999) (noting
that a mere twenty-three percent of persons surveyed have "a great deal" or
"quite a lot" of confidence in the criminal justice system) [hereinafter
SOURCEBOOK]. This sentiment was captured in the 1970s by the pessimistic
surmise that "nothing works," a reaction to Robert Martinson's meta-analysis
of then existing recidivism studies. See Robert Martinson, What Works?-
Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INTEREST 22 (1974); see
also FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL
POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981); DOUGLAS LIPTON ET AL; THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT
EVALUATION STUDIES (1975). Empirical work, however, belies this
unqualified pessimism. An increasing body of work supports that, in fact,
correctional interventions do have positive results, when the interventions
focus on particular offender populations and interventions. See generally DjA.
ANDREWS & JAMES BONITA, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT (2d ed.
1998); FRANCIS T. CULLEN & BRANDON K. APPLEGATE, OFFENDER
REHABILITATION: EFFECTIVE CORRECTIONAL INTERVENTION (1998).
139. See Jody L. Sundt, Is There Room for Change?: A Review of Public
Attitudes Toward Crime and Alternatives to Incarceration, 23 S. ILL. L. REV.
519, 526-32 (1999) (discussing public opinion surveys showing considerable
public support for alternatives to imprisonment).
140. Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI.
L. REV. 733, 733 (1998).
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earmarks of this reorientation were first seen in the
"community corrections" movement of the 1960s and 1970s.
Although the movement was initially oriented toward
rehabilitative goals, seeking offender re-socialization through
probation and parole, eventually the surveillance and
monitoring of offenders in the name of community safety
became the primary objective. 41 The conspicuous reliance on
information is also evident in the more recent, kindred
"community justice" movement, 142 which endorses a problem-
solving approach that seeks to forge connections among
available community resources to achieve and maintain
safety. 143 According to two of its chief proponents, "[t]he new
age of community justice is made possible by the power of
information.. . . Data, both official data about crimes and
offenders and qualitative data that come from interaction with
offenders, victims, and neighborhood residents, drive problem-
solving and action."144 In short, as sociologist Gary Marx has
observed, the community-based shift in penology is serving to
"diffuse the surveillance of the prison to the community at
large.' 45
The critical role of information is evident in yet another
popular contemporary method of social control: so-called
141. Joan Petersilia, The Evolution of Community Corrections, in
COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS: PROBATION, PAROLE, AND INTERMEDIATE
SANCTIONS 1 (Joan Petersilia ed., 1998) (noting that starting in the 1980s
probation and parole officers "were encouraged to redirect their efforts toward
offender surveillance and monitoring, with community safety rather than
offender rehabilitation as their primary goal").
142. See generally Todd R. Clear & David R. Karp, The Community Justice
Movement, in COMMUNITY JUSTICE: AN EMERGING FIELD 2-28 (David R. Karp
ed., 1998).
143. Id. at 14 (arguing that the "central focus is community-level outcomes,
shifting the emphasis from individual incidents to systemic patterns, from
individual conscience to social mores, and from individual goods to the
common good").
144. Id. at 18; see also id. at 13 ("The new frontier of community justice is
thus a cutting edge in the way it uses information, organizes staff, plans its
activities, and is accountable to its environment.").
145. GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 220
(1988); see also JOHN LOWmAN ET AL., TRANSCARCERATION: ESSAYS IN THE
SOCIOLOGY OF SOCIAL CONTROL 9 (1987) ("The advent of community
corrections and other non-segregative techniques of control has resulted in
more control, not less, as the control net is widened and its mesh thinned...
.") (citation omitted).
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"shame" sanctions. 146 Typically, such sanctions assume novel
form, requiring offenders to wear signs or shirts proclaiming
their crime of conviction, to affix Day-Glo bumper stickers to
their cars, or to plant placards on their property warning others
to beware. 147  Shame sanctions also take the form of
government-provided opprobrious information publicized in the
media, including newspapers, television, and billboards. 148 The
sanctions are thought to serve deterrent (both general and
specific), retributive, and educative functions. 149 They also
enjoy significant popularity with the public and bench alike, at
least as much for their innovative "gotcha" quality as for the
cost savings they represent in comparison to imprisonment. 150
Perhaps more important, from a penological perspective, as
Professor Dan Kahan has remarked, the increasing use of
shame sanctions has "enriched our punitive vocabulary,"151
146. See generally Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?,
63 U. Cmi. L. REv. 591 (1996); Toni M. Massaro, The Meanings of Shame:
Implications for Legal Reform, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POLY & L. 645 (1997); Aaron
S. Book, Note, Shame On You: An Analysis of Modern Shame Punishment as
an Alternative to Incarceration, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653 (1999); Phaedra
Kelly, Comment, The Ideology of Shame: An Analysis of First Amendment and
Eighth Amendment Challenges to Scarlet-Letter Probation Conditions, 77 N.C.
L. REV. 783 (1999).
147. Kahan, supra note 146, at 632-34.
148. See id. at 631-32; see also Courtney Persons, Note, Sex in the Sunlight:
The Effectiveness, Efficiency, Constitutionality, and Advisability of Publishing
Names and Pictures of Prostitutes' Patrons, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1525 (1996);
John Larrabee, Fighting Crime With a Dose of Shame, USA TODAY, June 19,
1995, at 3A (discussing the weekly cable television show of a Massachusetts
police chief who broadcasts the names and photographs of arrestees, branding
each with an epithet like "slithering low-life" or "punk of the week").
149. Garvey, supra note 140, at 738.
150. Kahan, supra note 146, at 632-37; see also Book, supra note 146 at 686
("The current problems of overcrowding in America's prisons and soaring
budgets have reached their limits .... Shaming punishment sets an example
for others and provides the public with a tangible sense ofjustice in action.").
151. Kahan, supra, note 146, at 630. Recently, Professor Stephen Garvey
provided a helpful analytic framework for conceiving of shame sanctions.
First, there are informational sanctions designed to "condemn and shame" the
offender before the public at-large, e.g., wearing a t-shirt proclaiming one's
criminal status. Second, there are sanctions designed more to educate or
reform the individual offender, which can be carried out in private, and come
in three forms: (1) talionic punishments, whereby the offender is forced to
experience the harm he has caused (e.g., being forced to watch the film
"Mississippi Burning" as a result of a hate crime); (2) talionic restitution,
whereby the offender must repair the harm caused (e.g., requiring a shoplifter
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finally permitting embrace of the undisguised moral
condemnation they signal. 152
The developments outlined above share a common
reliance on information to achieve social control beyond prison
walls. 153 They are part of a "new penology," which, unlike prior
efforts geared principally toward incarceration and
rehabilitation, endeavors to secure public safety within the
community through massive, impersonal surveillance and
management of potential criminal harm on the basis of
perceived risk.1 54 Sex offender registration and community
notification is part and parcel of this broader shift, insofar as it
achieves "community management of offenders" as a result of
"more eyes monitoring released offenders," 155 based on
information disseminated by the government. Notification
allows citizens to "actively participate in reclaiming the safety
of their neighborhoods, cities and towns," 156 and permits a
"problem-solving relationship [to] develop[ ] between criminal
justice professionals and local residents."157 The result marks
to work in a store); and (3) apology rituals, whereby the offender is required to
publicly express to his victims his remorse and the reasons underlying it. See
Garvey, supra note 140, at 784-94.
152. Kahan, supra note 146, at 635.
153. In a report prepared under the auspices of the U.S. Department of
Justice, Professors Michael Smith and Walter Dickey recently echoed this
information-based approach to corrections: 'The process ought to be grounded
in information, gathered systematically and periodically, about the particular
public safety threats and the naturally occurring community capacities to
contain them found, neighborhood by neighborhood, throughout a State."
Michael E. Smith & Walter J. Dickey, Reforming Sentencing and Corrections
for Just Punishment and Public Safety, in SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS:
ISSUES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 9 (U.S. Dep't. of Justice ed., Sept.
1999).
154. The main academic proponents of this view are Professors Malcolm
Feeley and Jonathan Simon. See generally Jonathan Simon & Malcolm M.
Feeley, True Crime: The New Penology and Public Discourse on Crime, in
PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL CONTROL: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SHELDON L.
MESSINGER 147-80 (Thomas G. Bloomberg & Stanley Cohen eds., 1995);
Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the
Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449
(1992). See also CRIME AND THE RISK SOCIETY (Pat O'Malley ed., 1999)
(collecting writings that touch on various aspects of this shift).
155. David Beatty, Community Notification-It's the Right Thing To Do, 59
CORRECTIONS TODAY, Oct. 1997, at 20.
156. Id.
157. CENTER FOR SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT, AN OVERVIEW OF SEX
OFFENDER COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION PRACTICES: POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND
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an important shift in social control. In contrast to the past two
centuries, during which control was achieved by dint of the
government's unmediated action on the individual, 158
registration and notification laws enlist the active involvement
of the community at-large to achieve broader control by means
of triangulation.
Although today sex offenders are the prime target of such
informational sanctions, this will not likely always be so.
Indeed, expansion to other offender populations would be
entirely consistent with the trajectory of penology, as manifest
in several recent developments. First, there is the general "net-
widening" witnessed with community-based sanctions more
generally over the years, 159 an evolution relatively unhindered
by judicial and public concern because the intrusiveness of such
sanctions is thought to pale in comparison to prison. 160 Second,
PROMISING APPROACHES 4 (1997).
158. For extended discussions of the nation's predominant dependence on
incarceration and penal institutions, starting in the late 1700s, and especially
since the 1820s, see generally INCARCERATING CRIMINALS: PRISONS AND JAILS
IN SOCIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT (Timothy J. Flanagan et al eds.,
1998); THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT
IN WESTERN SOCIETY (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1998);
INCAPACITATION: PENAL CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME
(Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins eds., 1995).
159. See James Austin & Barry Krisberg, The Unmet Promise of
Alternatives to Incarceration, 28 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 374, 405-06 (1982)
(recognizing that community-based alternatives to prison were being used to
exercise control over offenders previously placed on probation or released
pursuant to a suspended sentence). As one commentator recently noted, "if
alternative sanctions prove effective in dealing with traditionally non-
incarcerated felons, they may then merit serious consideration as sentencing
alternatives for a broader range of criminals." Note, Developments in the Law:
Alternatives to Incarceration, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1863, 1967-69 (1998); see also
Leena Kurki, Incorporating Restorative and Community Justice Into American
Sentencing and Corrections, in SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS, supra note
153 ("Restorative and community justice initiatives could continue to confine
their efforts to juvenile offenders and people who commit minor crimes. This
seems unlikely, as these approaches are expanding rapidly and winning many
new supporters who want to extend their application... . [1]t seems likely
that restorative and community justice values will to some extent become
more institutionalized in criminal justice processes.") (footnote omitted).
160. Professor Andrew Von Hirsch recently assailed the "anything but
prison" justification for community-based sanctions, which he asserted is
premised on "fallacies of intrusiveness" that obfuscate the actual burdens of
community intervention. Andrew Von Hirsch, The Ethics of Community-
Based Sanctions, in Petersilia, supra note 141, at 189-97. Von Hirsch
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information-based sanctions quench an enormous national need
for additional methods of social control necessitated by the
nation's overcrowded prisons. 161  Finally, informational
sanctions complement the current infatuation with
information-based innovations among law enforcement, 162 so-
called "technocorrections" in particular, 163 and American
observes:
Intervention in the community is tolerable irrespective of its
intrusiveness, this theory asserts, as long as the resulting sanction is
less onerous than imprisonment. This is tantamount to carte
blanche: Because imprisonment (at least for protracted periods) is
harsher than almost any other community punishment, one could
virtually never object.
Id. at 192.
161. Today, non-incarcerative sanctions by far constitute the dominant
form of correctional intervention in the U.S. In 1997, approximately seventy
percent of adults under correctional supervision were actually in the
community under the auspices of probation or parole. See SOURCEBOOK,
supra note 138, Table 6.1. This community orientation enjoys support from
liberals, because it compares favorably to incarceration as an alternative, and
from conservatives, because of the cost savings involved. For an insightful
discussion of the underlying political forces driving this change, see Mark C.
Dean-Myrda & Francis T. Cullen, The Panacea Pendulum: An Account of
Community as a Response to Crime, in Petersilia, supra note 141, at 3-18.
162. The enthusiastic embrace by law enforcement of sophisticated "crime
mapping" computer software and the use of DNA to track and prosecute
offenders represent only two of the many examples of this shift. See KEITH
HARRIES, MAPPING CRIME: PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE (1999); Paul E. Tracy &
Vincent Morgan, Big Brother and His Science Kit: DNA Databases for 21st
Century Crime Control?, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635 (2000). For
discussions of other representative innovations in this reorientation, see
WILnAM G. STAPLES, THE CULTURE OF SURVEILLANCE: DISCIPLINE AND
SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES (1997); Christopher Slobogin,
Technologically-Assisted Physical Surveillance: The American Bar
Association's Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 383 (1997);
Christopher S. Milligan, Note, Facial Recognition Technology, Video
Surveillance, and Privacy, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY L.J. 295 (1999); Kevin
Flynn, Police Gadgets Aim to Fight Crime With 007-Style Ingenuity, N.Y.
TIMES, March 7, 2000, at B2.
163. See generally Tony Fabelo, "Technocorrections": The Promises, the
Uncertain Threats, in SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS, supra note 153. After
discussing the variety of emerging information-reliant, technology-based
surveillance systems available to law enforcement, the author notes:
Reducing the risk of recidivism has always been part of the mission of
corrections, but only in the technocorrectional world is it possible to
reduce the risk of violent recidivism to almost zero. The promise of
technology to supervise offenders more effectively will accelerate the
impulse to expand technocorrections.
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society as a whole. 164 In short, there exists no principled reason
not to extend application of registration and community
notification regimes to populations other than convicted sex
offenders, 165 as currently advocated by some, 166 and which is
already being pursued in a limited way in several jurisdictions.
Indeed, although often overlooked due to the predominant focus
on serious sex offenders, registration and notification laws at
present often contain provisions expressly extending potential
Id. at 4.
164. Aspects of this shift have been noted by numerous authors, who warn
of an increasing indifference and passivity among Americans in the face of
significant privacy intrusions and losses. See, e.g., DAVID BRIN, THE
TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO CHOOSE BETWEEN
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? (1998); FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION
AGE (1997); CHARLES J. SYKES, THE END OF PRIVACY (1999).
165. This predilection toward expansion has already manifested in the
effort in many states to modify their registration and notification laws to cover
juvenile sex offenders. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 15-20-20, 15-20-28 (1999); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 290(m)-(n) (West 1999); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-3-
412.5(6.5) (West 1999); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. arts. 62.01-.12 (West
Supp. 2000). See generally Michael L. Skoglund, Note, Private Threats, Public
Stigma? Avoiding False Dichotomies in the Application of Megan's Law to the
Juvenile Justice System, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1805 (2000). It is also manifest in
legislative broadening of the expanse of sex offenses triggering registration
and notification. See, e.g., David Shepardson, State Adds Crime to List for Sex
Offenders, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 2, 1999, at D1 (discussing amendments in
Michigan law to include sodomy, sexual delinqency, child kidnapping, and
solicitation of a prostitute under the age of eighteen).
As discussed above, registration provisions alone for select offender sub-
groups, other than sex offenders, have been in existence for decades. See
supra Part II.A. and accompanying text; see also Licia A. Espositio,
Annotation, State Statutes or Ordinances Requiring Persons Previously
Convicted of Crime to Register With Authorities, 36 A.L.R. 5th 161 (1996 &
Supp. 1999).
166. See, e.g., Maria Orecchio & Theresa A. Tebbett, Sex Offender
Registration: Community Safety or Invasion of Privacy?, 13 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL COMMENT. 675, 699-700 (1999) ("If communities have the right to know
of the presence of convicted sex offenders, then they arguably have a similar
right with respect to other released violent criminals who have established
residence in their locales .... [T]he underlying purposes of community
notification laws pertaining to convicted sex offenders apply with equal force
to other violent offenders."); Allan Gustafson, Inmates Called Riskier Than
Fairview Men, STATESMAN JOURNAL (Salem, Or.), Jan. 22, 1998, at C1 (noting
the recent suggestion by the author of Oregon's notification law to the effect
that the law be "broaden[ed] ... to allow public notice when risky noncriminal
individuals are released from institutions").
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coverage to serious, non-sexual offenders' 67  as well as
numerous non-violent, sexually-oriented offenders. 168 Given
this likely expansion, 169 the availability of habeas becomes all
the more important.
167. Most commonly, statutory coverage extends to persons convicted of
kidnapping and false imprisonment or unlawful restraint of persons under 18
years of age, including attempts. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3821(A)(1)(2)
(1999); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-903(8) (Michie 1999); HAW. REV. STAT. §
846E-1 (1999); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 150/3 (1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-
4902(a)-(c) (1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 243.166(1)(ii),(2) (1999); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 7-19-301(a)(iv) (Michie 1999). Montana, however, extends coverage to
those convicted of homicides, aggravated assaults, robbery, kidnapping and
arson. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-23-502(9)(a) (1999). Kansas's law extends to
those convicted of homicides, including involuntary manslaughter. KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 22-4902(d) (1999). Minnesota targets those convicted of kidnapping
both minors and adults. MINN. STAT. § 243.166(a)(1)(ii) (2000). Arkansas
makes eligible those convicted of stalking as well as those who knowingly
expose others to the HIV virus. ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-903 (West 1999).
168. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 290(a)(2)(A) (West 1999) (possession of
child pornography); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4902(a)(4) (1999) (adultery,
consensual sodomy, if one of the parties is under eighteen); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 15:542(E) (West 1997) (consensual sodomy, bigamy); MICH. COMP.
LAWS §§ 28.722(d)(iii) (2000) (repeat visitations of indecent exposure and
"disorderly persons" laws); MINN. STAT. § 243.166(a) (indecent exposure and
possession of child pornography); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-11A-3, 30-6A-3
(Michie 1997) (possession of child pornography with intent to distribute); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.08, 2907.09, 2950.01(D)(1) (Anderson 1998)
(prohibiting public indecency and voyeurism); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-3-
430(C)(10)(12) (Law. Co-op. 1999) (buggery, 'peeping"). Consistent with this
broadening, a recent study in New Orleans concluded that over forty percent
of registrants listed on an internet website maintained by the state of
Louisiana were convicted under the state's anti-sodomy law, typically used to
prosecute male and female prostitutes. See Pamela Coyle, 400 Sex Offenders
in Region; Web Site Lists Many in N.O.: 44% Probably Prostitutes, TIMES
PICAYUNE (New Orleans), May 2, 2000, at Al.
169. Expansion in times to come might also be prompted by equal
protection claims based on a theory of under-inclusiveness, notwithstanding
that a "rational basis" standard of judicial review would likely apply. See, e.g.,
People v. Felarca, 88 Cal. Rptr. 2d 587, 593 (1999) (deeming "irrational" a
California law that required persons convicted of oral copulation with a minor
to register but not those convicted of sexual intercourse with a minor).
Such claims, however, would likely succumb to traditional judicial
deference to legislative authority. As the California Court of Appeal was at
pains to note in a prior case challenging the California sex registry,
[the fact that there are some types of classes of sex offenses which
are not made subject to registration does not per se require the
finding there is a denial of equal protection. This may be based upon
the legislative determination a particular type of offender does not
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B. THE CUSTODIAL EFFECTS OF REGISTRATION AND
NOTIFICATION
If indeed federal habeas "cuts through all forms and goes to
the very tissue of thb structure," as Justice Holmes once
observed, 170 then it is important to examine in a critical way
the actual effects of registration and notification on their
subjects. Even if one presumes that such laws constitute a
proper exercise of the police power,171 and do not impose
additional "punishment" or otherwise infringe constitutional
liberties, 172 this does not dictate that the custody jurisdictional
requirement is lacking, 173 thus precluding consideration of
recidivate or recidivates less .... In this final analysis, these are
matters for consideration for the Legislature and should be addressed
to that body.
People v. Mills, 146 Cal. Rptr. 411, 416 (1978). However, as courts become
sensitized to the current empirical uncertainty over whether sex offenders
recidivate more than others, we might witness a corresponding greater
receptivity to equal protection claims. See, e.g., David P. Bryden & Roger C.
Park, "Other Crimes" Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MINN. L. REV. 529,
572-73 (1994) (stating that "no study has demonstrated that sex offenders
have a consistently higher or lover recidivism rate than other major
offenders"); R. Karl Hanson & Monique T. Bussiere, Predicting Relapse: A
Meta-Analysis of Sexual Offender Recidivism Studies, 66 J. CONSULTING &
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 348, 357 (1998) (concluding based on a meta-analysis of
sixty-one follow-up studies that only thirteen percent of subjects committed
new sex offenses within a four-to-five year follow-up period); Kirk Heilbrun et
al., Sexual Offending: Linking Assessment, Intervention, and Decision-Making,
4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 138, 139 (1998) (noting that there is "little
consensus in the literature" on recidivism).
170. Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
171. See, e.g., Roe v. Office of Adult Probation, 938 F. Supp. 1080, 1092 (D.
Conn. 1996) (stating the laws seek "to protect the public from devastating
crimes. This goal certainly is one within the traditionally broad police powers
of the State").
172. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
173. Cf Dickerson v. Guste, 932 F.2d 1142, 1144 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding
that custody for habeas purposes is broader than "custody" required to trigger
speedy trial provisions). This same principle is evidenced in decisions of
courts grappling with the effects of sex offender community notification in
different constitutional contexts. See, e.g., State v. Scott, 961 P.2d 667, 676
(Kan. 1998) (concluding that notification does not constitute punishment
relative to the Eighth Amendment's ban against cruel and unusual
punishment); State v. Myers, 923 P.2d 1024, 1042 (Kan. 1996) (concluding
that notification does constitute punishment relative to the Ex Post Facto
Clause's ban against retroactive punishment). For a more general discussion
of this principle, see Wayne A. Logan, The Ex Post Facto Clause and the
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registrants' unrelated legal claims against their underlying
criminal judgments.174 Nor is it legally significant that the
constraints associated with the laws are less restrictive than
incarceration in prison or jail.175 While perhaps accurate, such
a comparison suggests a false question. The relevant question
for purposes of habeas jurisdiction is whether the laws impede
the capacity of an individual to live life, in the words of the
Seventh Circuit, "without a string upon his liberty."176 As
discussed next, the laws most assuredly do, as they carry very
significant consequences, of both a tangible and intangible
nature, which together amply satisfy the custody jurisdictional
requirement. 177
1. Tangible Consequences
Registration and notification have manifold tangible
consequences. Registration in itself differentially infringes
liberty: it both compels behaviors not required of one's fellow
citizens, and serves to limit freedoms otherwise taken for
granted by the public at-large. Indeed, to liken registration to
traditional licensing schemes, such as attend driving a car,
owning a firearm, or conducting a business, vastly understates
what is involved. One can elect to not own a gun, drive a car,
or pursue a particular livelihood. One cannot opt out of
registration, which in at least four jurisdictions requires
persons to possess special identification cards, 178 and in
numerous others requires payment of annual registration
fees. 179 Moreover, registration information must be verified at
Jurisprudence of Punishment, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1261, 1285-88 (1998).
174. See LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra note 15, § 9.1, at 363-410 (surveying
the broad array of constitutional claims reached by federal habeas); § 11.2(c),
at 452-86.
175. Contra People v. Adams, 581 N.E.2d 637, 641 (Ill. 1991) (noting that a
registration "requirement is an innocuous duty compared to the potential
alternative of spending an extended period of years in prison").
176. Mackenzie v. Barrett, 141 F. 964, 966 (7th Cir. 1905).
177. At present, U.S. jurisdictions reflect considerable variation both in
their methods and means of registration and notification. See supra notes 70-
86 and accompanying text. Therefore, analysis of the custody question must
necessarily be jurisdiction-specific, and, when appropriate, consider the
registration and notification effects imposed on a given habeas petitioner. The
basic thrust of the discussion here, however, should be generally applicable to
registration and notification laws nationwide.
178. See supra note 72.
179. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-911, -918 (Michie 1999); IDAHO
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least annually for a minimum often years, 180 and often times at
considerably shorter intervals, 181 with compliance compelled by
threat of criminal prosecution. 182
In short, registration, even if by mail, and most certainly if
required in person, as Justice Fried of the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court has observed, amounts to a
"continuing, intrusive, and humiliating regulation of the person
himself."1 83 The constant necessity to apprise law enforcement
of one's whereabouts under threat of prosecution represents a
unique encumbrance, 184 which chills registrants' freedom of
movement, affecting temporary visits to other jurisdictions 185
CODE § 18-8307(4) (Supp. 1999); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 150/3(c)(6) (West
Supp. 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, § 11226 (West 1999); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-23-504(5) (1999).
180. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071(b) (Supp. 1999); see also supra note 73 and
accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 846E-5 (Michie 1999) (requiring
registration every three months for all registrants); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-
4904(c) (1999) (same); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 28.725 a(4)(b) (1999) (same).
Persons deemed "sexually violent predator[s]" and other more serious
offenders are commonly required to verify registration, and sometimes be
photographed anew, every 90 days. See, e.g., N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168-(f)
(McKinney 1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-460 (Law. Co-op. 1999).
182. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. Furthermore, registration
violations can serve as predicate offenses for purposes of habitual felon
sentence enhancement laws. See, e.g., Hampton v. State, No. CC-98-229, 1999
WL 982401, at *2 (Ala. Crim. App. Oct. 29, 1999) (deeming a registration
violation, a "Class C" felony, as a sufficient basis to enhance a sentence under
the state Habitual Felony Offender Act).
183. Doe v. Attorney Gen., 686 N.E.2d 1007, 1016 (Mass. 1997) (Fried, J.,
concurring). Justice Fried continued: "To require registration of persons not in
connection with any particular activity asserts a relationship between
government and the individual that is in principle quite alien to our
traditions, a relationship which when generalized has been the hallmark of
totalitarian government." Id.
184. This burden extends even to those forced to seek temporary
habitations, a not unusual occurrence given the housing difficulties faced by
registrants. See State v. Pray, 980 P.2d 240, 243 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)
(upholding the conviction of individual for failure to register while living in
three different locations over a ten-day period). In Washington State,
permanent transients classified as Level II or III offenders must report in
person to police and verify their registration information on a weekly basis,
and Level I registrants must do so on a monthly basis. See Sarah Duran, Is
There a Sex Offender Living Next Door?, THE NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma, Wash.),
June 4, 2000, at Al.
185. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.0435(2) (West Supp. 2000); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.723(3) (West 1998).
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and most certainly permanent moves. 186 As noted by one
Washington appellate judge: "It is inconceivable to think that
one who must, as his first act, go to local law enforcement and
announce that he is a felon convicted of a sex offense will not be
deterred from moving in order to avoid divulging that
ignominious event."187 Registrants also experience severe
constraints on the most personal decision to change their
names, 188 and are often forced to endure geographic limits on
where they can live and work. 8 9 Suffice it to say, the manifold
encumbrances experienced by registrants go well beyond those
endured by other citizens in their everyday lives, involving
terms and conditions often identical to those endured by
186. This stems both from the fact that states vary in the aggressiveness of
their registration and notification regimes and from the obvious disincentives
associated with being subject to a new wave of notification upon relocating to a
new jurisdiction, or even when relocating within a given jurisdiction.
187. State v. Taylor, 835 P.2d 245, 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (Agid, J.,
dissenting); cf City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849, 1857 (1999)
(citation omitted) (identifying "the 'right to remove from one place to another
according to inclination' as 'an attribute of personal liberty' protected by the
Constitution"); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969) (invalidating a
one-year residency requirement for welfare eligibility because the limit
infringed the right to "travel throughout the length and breadth of our land
uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which unreasonably burden or
restrict this movement").
188. Williamson, 151 F.3d at 1181; see also, e.g., CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §
1279.6 (West Supp. 1999) (prohibiting any change unless the court deems "it is
in the best interest of justice to grant [the change] and that doing so will not
adversely affect the public safety"); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-101 (West 1999)
(prohibiting change for entire registration period); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
547:3-i(II) (1997 & Supp. 1999) (permitting change only if registrant "makes a
compelling showing that a name change is necessary"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-
27-21.5(16) (1999) (prohibiting change during the entire registration period).
189. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-20-26 (1999); MINN. STAT. § 244.052 (sub. 3)
(k), (sub. 4) (1999); see also Debra Baker, Slamming the Door: N.J. Court Lets
Homeowners Turn Down Renters, Buyers on Megan's Law List, A.B.A. J., Jan.
2000, at 24 (discussing decision by New Jersey trial court to uphold bylaw of
homeowners' association that barred sale or lease of property to registrants).
Judge Richard Matsch recently enjoined application of a Colorado local
ordinance prohibiting sex offenders from living together. Karen Abbott, Judge
Puts Sex Offender Law on Hold, DENVER RocKY MTN. NEWS, Feb. 2, 2000, at
21A. He did so in response to a suit brought by a family containing three
foster sons who were registered sex offenders. Id. Judge Matsch further
noted that he didn't "like wharfs going on." Id.
Limits on employment are at times backed up by the threat of civil fines
for employers if a registrant is not terminated. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 5-
2-12-12 (West Supp. 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 584(F) (West 1999).
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probationers and parolees, legal statuses which as a matter of
course satisfy the habeas custody requirement. 190
Less direct, but surely no less consequential, are the
tangible byproducts of community notification. Registrants
have experienced arson and vandalism of their homes, 191 and
been the victims of violence 192 and harassment.193 Suicides, not
surprisingly, also have been associated with notification, 194 as
have job firings and forced moves from living arrangements
(presuming a living space can be found in the first instance). 195
190. See Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1963) (holding that
constraints associated with parole satisfy the custody requirement for habeas
petitions); Cervantes v. Walker, 589 F.2d 424, 425 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding
same with respect to probation). Indeed, it is not uncommon for registration
and notification to be imposed as conditions of probation or parole. See, e.g.,
State v. Hutchinson, No. 99-0034, 2000 WL 722572, at *3 (La. Ct. App. May
17, 2000).
191. See, e.g., Steven Amick, Vandals Attack Ex-Convicts Home, THE
OREGONIAN (Portland), July 27, 1996, at Bl; David Ammons, Released Sex
Offender Hounded in Northwest, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1993, at A18.; Kathryn
Wexler & Sarah Schweitzer, Fears Build into Second Arson of Predator's
Home, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Nov. 24, 1999, at Bl; Carolyne Zinko,
Flyers Falsely Call Artist a Molester, SAN FRANcISco CHRONICLE, July 14,
1997, at Al.
192. See, e.g., Robert Hanley, Neighbor Accused of Firing at House of
Paroled Rapist, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1998, at B6; Jon Nordheimner, 'Vigilante'
Attack in New Jersey is Linked to Sex-Offenders Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11,
1995, at Al. See generally Paul Zielbauer, Posting of Sex Offender Registries
on Web Sets Off Both Praise and Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2000, at Bl
(citing and discussing several violent attacks).
193. See, e.g., Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(describing an incident in which a registrant and his mother were forced to
flee a community after Guardian Angels distributed wanted posters and
reporters staked out residence around the clock); Steven Amick, Protestors
Win, Sex Offender Will Move, THE OREGONIAN (Portland), July 30, 1996, at B2
(describing how protestors placed torches on front lawn of registrant, who soon
moved); Katherine Long, Gas Station Picketed Over Ex-Con's Hiring: Boss
Stands By Choice, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 2, 1995, at B5 (describing a
demonstration during rush hour intended to discourage drivers from
patronizing a gas station that employed a registrant); John T. McQuiston, Sex
Offender is Suing His Neighbors Over Protests, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1997, at
B (describing protest rallies directed at registrant, a brick-throwing incident,
and harassment calls to the registrant's employer).
194. See, e.g., Todd S. Purdum, Death of Sex Offender is Tied to Megan's
Law, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1998, at A16 (describing two separate suicides).
195. See, e.g., Allen G. Breed, Paroled Sex Offender Tests Couple's Faith,
THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 2, 1999, at 10A; David Chanen, Threats
Lead to Eviction of St. Paul Sex Offender, STAR-TRIBUNE (Minneapolis), Feb.
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Nor are these hardships suffered by the registrants alone, as
family and friends can become the open subject of community
anger and disdain.196 Moreover, in a perverse twist, the
blunderbuss character of the laws can result in the singling out
of victims, especially when a registrant has been convicted of
incest or another intra-familial sex offense. 9 7
Some courts and commentators have downplayed the legal
gravity of these events because they come at the hands of third
parties, not the government; the government merely makes
registrants' information available, and bears neither legal nor
26, 1998, at Bi; Lisa Richardson, Megan's Law is Put to Test as Towns Bounce
Child Molesters, L.A. TIMES, May 25, 1997, at A3; Lisa Sink, Long After
Release Date, Man Still Lives in Prison, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 1,
1999, at 1.
According to one recent survey of registrants, "housing and employment
have become nearly impossible [to find] for sex offenders." Richard G. Zevitz
& Mary Ann Farkas, Sex Offender Community Notification: Managing High
Risk Criminals or Exacting Further Vengeance?, 18 BEHAV. SC. & LAW 375,
388 (2000). The authors relate the experience of one Wisconsin registrant:
I was evicted from my apartment. I found another apartment that I
could afford. The DOC said, no, you can't live here because it was
fairly close to a school. We found another place, but it was kind of
close to a park. So then we came out here only because my
girlfriend's mother owns the place .... It's like I'm stuck here
because Im afraid to move. As soon as I move, they're going to
renotify and it's going to be the whole shebang again.
Id. at 382. Another interviewee recounted that he had moved seven times in a
five-month period, and described one particular eviction: "On [] Street, I was
there for 22 hours and the police chief personally came with my PO and the
supervisor, and handed me a piece of paper for the neighborhood saying I was
removed from the neighborhood." Id. Other interviewees related that they
were left with no housing option other than return to the care of the
Department of Corrections. Id.
196. See, e.g., Zevitz & Farkas, supra note 195 at 382-84 (surveying
hardships suffered by family and friends reported by Wisconsin registrants);
Gene Warner, 2 Sex Offenders Say They Don't Deserve Harsh Label, BUFFALO
NEWS, Dec. 27, 1999, at B1 (recounting physical beatings and harassment
suffered at school by a registrant's child).
197. This occurrence itself is quite likely given the empirical reality that
sex crime victims most often know or are related to their assailants. See
LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD, U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEX
OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS 4 (1997) (citing data that three-out-of-four rape
and sexual assault victims had a prior relationship with their assailant).
Indeed, this empirical reality gives force to perhaps the most compelling
argument against the undifferentiated use of registration and notification
laws, undercutting their implicit assumption that information is needed to
guard against victimization by strangers.
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moral responsibility. 198  However, despite the Rehnquist
Court's steely view that the government has no affirmative
duty under the Constitution to prevent individuals from
harming one another,199 it is at best naive (and at worst
disingenuous) to suggest that notification merely entails the
provision by government of neutral information to the public. 20°
As Professor James Whitman observed in the context of shame
sanctions, more generally, the government's release of highly
stigmatizing information forges a "complicity between the state
and the crowd."20 1 "Once the state stirs up public opprobrium
against an offender, it cannot really control the way the public
treats the offender.... When our government dangles a sex
offender or a drunk driver before the public, it has vanishingly
little control over how the public treats that person."20 2 In
198. For instance, according to the Western District of Michigan,
registration and notification do
nothing more than compile truthful, public information and make it
available. To the extent public use of such information may result in
damage to plaintiffs' reputation or may destabilize their employment
and other community relations, such effects ... would appear to flow
most directly from plaintiffs' own convicted misconduct and from
private citizens' reactions thereto, and only tangentially from state
action.
Doe v. Kelley, 961 F. Supp. 1105, 1112 (W.D. Mich. 1997); see also Doe v.
Pataki, 120 F.3d 1263, 1279-80 (2d Cir. 1997) (acknowledging that notification
is "doubtless the 'but for' cause of some" vigilantism, but rejecting that such
acts are fairly "attributable to community notification" per se); State v.
Williams, 728 N.E.2d 342, 357 (Ohio 2000) (stating "[it cannot be presumed
that the receipt of public information will compel private citizens to
lawlessness").
199. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189,
197 (1989). See generally Barbara E. Armacost, Affirmative Duties, Systemic
Harms, and the Due Process Clause, 96 MICH. L. REV. 982 (1996) (discussing
the rationales and criticisms of "failure-to-protect" jurisprudence).
200. Cf Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The
Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 7 (1991) ("No one doubts that Hester Prynne's scarlet letter provided
more than neutral information, or that the effort of Senator Joseph McCarthy
to 'expose' the background of his political opponents was not simply public
education.") (footnotes omitted).
201. James Q. Whitman, What is Wrong With Inflicting Shame Sanctions?,
107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1059 (1998); see also id. at 1088 (asserting that shame
sanctions "involve a dangerous willingness, on the part of the government, to
delegate part of its enforcement power to a fickle and uncontrolled general
populace").
202. Id.; see also Kreimer, supra note 200, at 40-41 ("Where the relations
between the subject of disclosure and the recipient of the disclosed information
188
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short, the government's release of incendiary information
unavoidably places tangible limits on the lives of registrants,
limits not shared by other citizens.2 3 A "string" is purposefully
imposed on registrants' liberty.
2. Intangible Consequences
Beyond the significant tangible consequences of
registration and notification, the laws carry a litany of other
intangible consequences, with effects arguably even more
invasive than those just discussed. These consequences can be
characterized as at once having both expulsive and
constraining qualities, effects that share a fundamental
intrusiveness on the core privacy interests of registrants.
a. Expulsion
Released sex offenders, like other individuals convicted of
crimes, incur the inevitable stamp of criminal ignominy.2°4
are already charged with violent potential, disclosure is a virtual invitation.");
Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880,
1938 (1991) ("Once an offense becomes notorious, the public will do as it
chooses with the information."); Robert A. Prentky, Community Notification
and Constructive Risk Reduction, 11 J. OF INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 295, 296
(1996) (stating that vigilantism is the "logical outcome of telling people that an
evil menace lurks next door").
203. Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly signaled its sensitivity to
the causal relation between the release of information and the dangers
presented by the predictable reactions of third parties. See, e.g., Thornburgh
v. Am. College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 766-67 (1986)
(regarding the possible harassment of women seeking abortions as a result of
the government's disclosure of their identities), overruled on other grounds by
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Brown v. Socialist Workers
'74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 92-93 (1982) (regarding possible threat of
harassment of political contributors as a result of disclosing their names).
204. In modern times, this labeling plays a paramount role in the criminal
adjudicatory process. See DAvID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN
SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY 252 (1990) ("[Plenality communicates
meaning not just about crime and punishment but also about power,
authority, legitimacy, normality, morality, personhood, social relations, and a
host of other tangential matters."); PRINCIPLED SENTENCING: READINGS ON
THEORY AND POLICY 416 (Andrew von Hirsch & Andrew Ashworth eds., 2d ed.
1998) (observing that "the convicted offender is excluded from the moral
universe of discourse, and is made to serve merely as the object of and conduit
for public messages of denunciation"). This denunciatory fimction, with its
stigmatizing force, however, has not always been foremost. In colonial
America, for instance, society viewed offenders more as sinners than as
irredeemably flawed individuals. See WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION
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This labeling, however, is far more acute than that experienced
by their ex-offender counterparts. Registration and notification
(the latter in particular) raise the likelihood-indeed, seek to
ensure-that their subjects will be expelled from everyday
society. In contrast to being permitted to live anonymously
with their ex-offender status, registrants are publicly and
affirmatively singled out by the government as "sex offenders,"
a distinctly odious label in contemporary America.2 5 This
designation, moreover, is backed by legislative "findings" that
they pose especially high risk for recidivism (a designation not
publicly shared by other ex-offenders) or, certainly, citizens
more generally.20 6
In addition, although jurisdictions vary in their semantics,
registrants are frequently branded with far more emotionally
evocative terms such as "predatory sex offenders,"207 "sexually
OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS
SOCIETY, 1760-1830 39 (1975) ("Like sin, crime could strike in any man's
family or among any man's neighbors.").
205. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing acute disdain for
sex offenders). Recognition of this unique stigma is evidenced in the several
state and federal courts that have held that the stigmatizing effects of
registration and notification jeopardize a liberty interest, sufficient to require
due process protections before the laws are applied. See supra note 94.
Moreover, federal courts uniformly recognize this stigma in due process claims
by inmates seeking to avoid being branded "sex offenders" in the prison
environment. See Chambers v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 205 F.3d 1237, 1242-43
(10th Cir. 2000) (recognizing an inmate's liberty interest in "not being labeled
a sex offender."); Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285, 1291-92 (11th Cir. 1999)
(recognizing an inmate's liberty interest in "not being branded a sex offender,"
an interest similar to that in not being branded "mentally ill"); Neal v.
Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 829 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that it could "hardly
conceive of a state's action bearing more 'stigmatizing consequences' than the
labeling of a prison inmate as a sex offender").
206. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-902 (Michie 1999) ("The General
Assembly finds that sex offenders pose a high risk of reoffending after release
from custody."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.21(3)(a) (West 2000) ("Sexual offenders
are extremely likely to use physical violence and repeat their offenses."); NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-4002 (Michie Supp. 2000) ("The Legislature finds that
sex offenders present a high risk to commit repeat offenses."); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 23-3-400 (West 1999) ("Statistics show that sex offenders often pose a high
risk of re-offending."); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-39-101(b)(1) (1997) ("[Slexual
offenders pose a high risk of engaging in further offenses after release.., and
protection from these offenders is a paramount public interest.").
207. E.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 181.586 (Lexis Supp. 1999); see also FLA.
STAT. ANN. ch. 775.21 (West 2000) (referring to "sexual predators").
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violent predators,"208 or "habitual sex offenders." 209 As recently
noted by the New York Court of Appeals, this exercise is
"[m]ore than 'name calling by public officials."'2 10  Such
designations "can have a considerable adverse impact on an
individual's ability to live in a community and obtain or
maintain employment."211 Even in those jurisdictions that
designate registrants in terms of ostensibly objective risk
"levels," as in Washington State, each level carries a
corresponding degree of disclosure and opprobrium, and hence
community disdain and apprehension.212 The upshot of this
massive exercise in branding is that registrants experience a
double-stigmatization: (1) their offense history is purposefully
208. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. art. 15:542.1 (West Supp. 2000); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 14-208.6A (Lexis 1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-460 (West Supp.
1999). Federal law expressly requires that jurisdictions identify "sexually
violent predators." 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(2)(C) (2000). Such an offender is one
who has "been convicted of a sexually violent offense and who suffers from a
mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes the person likely to
engage in predatory sexually violent offenses." Id. § 14071(a)(3)(C).
209. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.01 (B) (Anderson 1999); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 584(H)(b) (West Supp. 2000).
The derogatory quality of the labels used, in lieu of the more neutral
phrase "sex offender," is itself worthy of note, in that it comports with the
justice system's historic preference for "filth" metaphors in reference to
criminals. See Martha G. Duncan, In Slime and Darkness: The Metaphor of
Filth in Criminal Justice, 68 TUL. L. REV. 725 (1994). Referring to sex
offenders in such hyperbolic terms, to borrow from Professor Duncan, "tends to
hide the criminal's humanity while encouraging us to see the criminal as an
object. Moreover, the metaphor invites a particular emotional response to the
criminal, the same one we consciously feel toward slime: disgust." Id. at 799;
see also Doe v. Pataki, 940 F. Supp. 603, 621-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting a
New York legislator's comment in consideration of that state's registration and
notification law, likening sex offenders to the "human equivalent of toxic
waste"), affd in part, rev'd in part, 120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997); Malcolm
Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy
of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 470 (1992)
(referring to modern American penology as serving a "kind of waste
management function"); Peter Linebaugh, (Marxist) Social History and
(Conservative) Legal History: A Reply to Professor Langbein, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV.
212, 238-39 (1985) (likening the criminal justice system in eighteenth century
England to a "garbage collection system").
210. People v. David W., 733 N.E. 2d 206, 210 (N.Y. 2000) (quoting Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 703 (1976)).
211. Id. at 211.
212. See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.550(1)-(2), (4) (2000); see also Logan,
supra note 74, at 602-19 (describing similar methods in other jurisdictions).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:147
and publicly made known and (2) they experience a 'judicially-
endorsed pronouncement" that they pose an accentuated risk to
fellow community members. 213 Judge Myron Thompson of the
Middle District of Alabama recently characterized the
phenomenon as follows:
While it might seem that a convicted felon could have little left of his
good name, community notification in this case will inflict a greater
stigma than would result from conviction alone. Notification will
clearly brand the plaintiff as a "criminal sex offender"... a "badge of
infamy" that he will have to wear for at least 25 years-and strongly
implies that he is a likely recidivist and a danger to his community.
214
As a result, beyond the severe and tangible outcomes
resulting from vigilantism and harassment,215  offenders
experience banishment from their customary social, physical,
and economic worlds, 216 for at least ten years and often for their
213. E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1117 (3d Cir. 1997) (Becker, C.J.,
concurring and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original).
214. Doe v. Pryor, 61 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1231 (M.D. Ala. 1999); see also Doe
v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 419 (N.J. 1995) (notification exposes a registrant to
"public opprobrium not only identifying him as a sex offender but also
labelling him as potentially currently dangerous"); cf Liberty Lobby v.
Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J.) ("Even the public
outcast's remaining good reputation, limited in scope though it may be, is not
inconsequential."), vacated on other grounds by 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
215. See supra notes 191-197 and accompanying text.
216. See E.B., 119 F.3d at 1102 ("Knowing that someone is a convicted sex
offender and has been evaluated as a continuing risk is likely to affect how
most people treat that person."); Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 467-68
(S.D.N.Y 1998) ("[Widespread dissemination of the above information is likely
to carry with it shame, humiliation, ostracism . . . ."); Commonwealth v.
Williams, 733 A.2d 593, 606 (Pa. 1999) ("Notification puts the registrant's
livelihood, domestic tranquility, and personal relationships all around him in
grave jeopardy."); see also Duncan, supra note 209, at 751-55 (noting that,
historically, likening offenders to "slime" and "filth" facilitates their
banishment).
As noted, banishment seemingly represents one of the central appeals of
the laws. See, e.g., Pataki, 940 F. Supp. at 621-22 (quoting a New York
legislator's enforcement of the state's notification law: "I think that one of the
results of this legislation might be that this guy is going to go out of town, out
of state, and that's very good for us."), affd and rev'd in part on other grounds,
120 F.3d 1263 (2d Cir. 1997); Sheila Grissett, Law Keeps Sex Offenders in
Public Eye, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 24, 1993, at B1 (quoting a
Louisiana official's approving conclusion that the state's aggressive
notification law has discouraged sex offenders from locating in Louisiana);
Turning Point: The Revolving Door: When Sex Offenders Go Free (ABC
TELEVISION BROADCAST, Sept. 21, 1994) (quoting police officer who stated that
"Washington, by having a sexual offender law, is, in essence, telling its sexual
offender, 'Hey, you'd best leave the state if you don't want to be registered.').
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lifetimes. "Notification draws a line not only between
neighbors and an offender, but also between neighbors and
anyone who offers the offender much-needed support, including
relatives, friends, and employers. 2 17 According to Chief Judge
Edward Becker of the Third Circuit,
the burden imposed by the collective weight of all these effects is
borne by the offender in all aspects of his life. At worst, the offender
is literally cut off from any interaction with the wider community. He
is unable to find work or a home, cannot socialize, and is subject to
violence or at least the constant threat of violence ... . Although
perhaps some people will hire him or rent him a home, his social
But see Rutherford v. Blankenship, 468 F. Supp. 1357, 1360 (W.D. Va. 1979)
("To permit one state to dump its convict criminals into another is not in the
interests of safety and welfare; [it] ... is prohibited by public policy."); People
v. Baum, 231 N.W. 95, 96 (Mich. 1930) (stating that such an orientation
"tend[s] to incite dissension, provoke retaliation, and disturb that fundamental
equality of political rights among the several states which is the basis of the
union itself').
217. Lois Presser & Elaine Gunnison, Strange Bedfellows: Is Sex Offender
Notification a Form of Community Justice?, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 299, 309
(1999). As Professor James Whitman recently asked: "Does anyone really
doubt that our own shame sanctions, whether directed against sex offenders or
drunk drivers, have some impact on 'public opinion' about that person?"
Whitman, supra note 201, at 1088. Writing with respect to shame sanctions
more generally, Whitman observes: "The problem with shame sanctions ... is
that . . . they exclude the offender entirely from the life of ordinary
transactions just as members of shunned classes are excluded everywhere
from the simple dignity of admission to the marketplace." Id. at 1090 n.155.
Whether community notification, as a technical matter, is a 'shame
sanction" has been the subject of some disagreement. Professor Stephen
Garvey, for one, asserts that "the primary aim of [notification] is nether to
shame nor to educate. Public notification statutes appear designed primarily
to protect third parties." Garvey, supra note 140, at 737 n.21. However,
whatever the "primary aim" of notification, the unavoidable and irreducible
outcome of notification is that it stigmatizes registrants with shameful
information, and for this reason most commentators consider community
notification a shame sanction. See, e.g., Daniel Feldman, The "Scarlet Letter
Laws" of the 1990s: A Response to Critics, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1081 (1997);
Whitman, supra note 201; April R. Bedarf, Comment, Examining Sex Offender
Community Notification Laws, 83 CAL. L. REV. 885, 911-13 (1995); see also
E.B., 119 F.3d at 1119 (Becker, C.J., concurring and dissenting in part)
(characterizing notification as "the functional equivalent of shaming
punishments"); AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 62 (1999)
("[Allthough community notification would ideally lead to reintegrative
shaming rather than to its punitive counterpart, in either case 'outing' the
offender is necessary, both for shaming to work and for the community to be
protected.").
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intercourse with others is all but non-existent. The effects of
notification permeate his entire existence. 21
8
Conceived in these terms, the laws impose a de facto (if not de
jure) banishment, a restraint manifestly not "shared by the
public generally."219
b. Constraint
In a corollary sense, the laws also achieve a quarantine-
like constraint of registrants.220 Plainly, the workplace and
residential limits, the requirement that offenders update their
registration information at prescribed intervals, and numerous
other requirements (e.g., providing advance notice of
residential and name changes) have self-restraining effects. At
the same time, the dissemination of registrants' identifying
information, coupled with the use of uniquely stigmatizing
labels (e.g., "sexual predator"), constrain registrants in a more
subtle and pervasive phenomenological sense.22 1  The laws
218. E.B., 119 F.3d at 1125 (Becker, C.J., concurring and dissenting in
part); cf Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing
Norms, With Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 369,
371 (1999) ("It is important to note... that even when viewed purely as an
external sanction, that is, as the product of the actions or reactions of other
people, shame (like guilt) is felt even if other people take no action.").
For classic treatments of the disabling effects of social stigma more
generally, see ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF
SPOILED IDENTITY 5 (1963); S. GIORA SHOHAM & GIORA RAHAV, THE MARK OF
CAIN: THE STIGMA THEORY OF CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVIANCE (2d ed. New York
Press 1982). As Professor Goffman observes, "[w]e believe the person with the
stigma is not quite human. On this assumption, we . . . reduce his life
chances." Goffman supra, at 5; cf 2 ALEXIS DETOCQUEvILLE, DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 261 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1985) (1840) ("In a democratic country...
public favor seems as necessary as the air we breathe, and to live at variance
with the multitude is, as it were, not to live.").
219. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240 (1963); see also Poodry v.
Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 895-97 (2d Cir. 1996)
(holding that threatened banishment from the Seneca Indian tribe and land
satisfied the habeas custody requirement).
220. See People v. Pennington, 610 N.W.2d 608, 611 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000)
(per curiam) (observing that the laws closely resemble "quarantine notices
when public health is endangered by individuals with infectious diseases" and
that with notification "individuals can expect to experience some
embarrassment and isolation").
221. As Professor Seth Kreimer has noted, "[tihe impact of stigma depends
upon the strength and pervasiveness of the mobilized hostility. To be branded
a Socialist in 1954 is quite different than being branded a Socialist in 1990."
Kreimer, supra note 200, at 53. Given this relationship, and the
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carry the paralyzing influence of social opprobrium, which, as
John Stuart Mill once observed "leaves fewer means of escape,
penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and
enslaving the soul itself."222 Registrants thus are forced to
inhabit the world of "the Other," the self-conscious existential
realm identified by Jean-Paul Sartre that operates on
"recognition of the fact that I am indeed that object which the
Other is looking at and judging."22 3 This sensibility was
evidenced in a recent survey of Wisconsin sex offender
registrants, two of whom told the interviewer the following:
I feared for the longest time going out on the street, that there might
be some type of vigilante attitude .... There were people in the
building trying to get a petition together to have the sex offenders
that were in the paper ousted from the building .... It caused me to
be more confined and I felt ostracized from everyone there.
Just wondering ... do they know? It kind of induces paranoia,
you get all worried every time you see someone looking at you like
they read it. You think-they know. You wonder, if someone
confronts me, what am I going to say9W4
Registration and notification achieve this constraint by in
effect deputizing one's fellow citizens, in modern parlance
making them "co-producers" of public safety and instruments of
the state's surveillance apparatus. As two commentators
recently observed, registration and notification "generalize[ ]
the incapacitative functions of prison beyond the prison and,
indeed, beyond the dominion of government... There is no
shortage of [citizen] volunteers to police those conditions.'2 25 In
this sense, the laws achieve an effect sought by eighteenth
century philosopher Jeremy Bentham's infamous, yet mythical,
Panopticon with its central tower and inspector's lodge.226 This
unprecedented disdain currently felt for sex offenders, the government-
sponsored labels used today obviously engender unique stigma.
222. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 4-5 (David Spitz ed., W.W. Norton &
Co., Inc. 1975) (1859); see also Kreimer, supra note 200, at 6 ("he power of
public opprobrium, once evoked, is often more pervasive and more penetrating
than criminal punishment.").
223. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS: AN ESSAY ON
PHENOMENOLOGICAL ONTOLOGY 222 (Hazel E. Barnes trans., 1956).
224. Zevitz & Farkas, supra note 195, at 382-83.
225. Presser & Gunnison, supra note 217, at 310.
226. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS (Miran Bozovic
ed., Vers. 1995) (1791). Panoptic correctional houses were actually
constructed in the United States: in 1800, Virginia utilized a semi-Panoptic
design for its prison; Pennsylvania and Illinois built Panoptic prisons in 1826
and 1919, respectively. JOHN W. ROBERTS, REFORM AND RETRIBUTION: AN
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is because, like the Panopticon, notification endeavors to give
the impression that those subject are constantly being watched,
even when perhaps not.227 The avowed goal of the Panoptic
system, philosopher Michel Foucault once observed, is to induce
"a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the
automatic finctioning of power. So to arrange things that the
surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is
discontinuous in its action."228 By like effect, registration and
notification laws, with their stifling array of coercive, pan-
geographic consequences, 229 achieves a "hidden custody"2 30 by
means of a coalition of police, neighbors, and society at-large,
which, like panopticism also depends on classification and
ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF AMERICAN PRISONS 55 (1997).
227. REG WHITAKER, THE END OF PRIVACY: How TOTAL SURVEILLANCE IS
BECOMING A REALITY 35 (1999) ("The Inspector sees without being seen. His
presence, which is also an absence, is in his gaze alone. Of course, the
omnipresence of the Inspector is nothing more than an architectural artifice,
really just an elaborate conjuring trick.").
228. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 201 (Alan Sheridan
trans., Vintage Books 1979). Foucault elaborates:
There are two images, then, of discipline. At one extreme, the
discipline-blockade, the enclosed institution . . . . At the other
extreme, with panopticism, is the discipline-mechanism: a functional
mechanism that must improve the exercise of power by making it
lighter, more rapid, more effective, a design of subtle coercion for a
society to come.
Id. at 209.
229. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text (discussing constraints
and national coverage of registration and notification laws). Indeed, if a
registrant changes state residence, he is required to deduce whether his crime
of conviction compels registration within that new state, as states differ in
their respective substantive requirements. So, before going to the trouble of
registering with local police, a potential registrant might be faced with a
difficult legal research project, a burden not shared by other newcomers. See,
e.g., Roe v. Attorney Gen, No. 99-2706-H, 1999 WL 1260188, at *1 (Mass.
Super. Nov. 23, 1999) (discussing the difficulty of discerning whether the
crime of conviction in Florida constituted a "like offense" requiring registration
as a "sex offender" under Massachusetts law); see also, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 54-251(a) (1999) ("If any person who is subject to registration under this
section regularly travels into or within another state or temporarily resides in
another state.., such person shall notify the Commissioner of Public Safety
and shall also register with an appropriate agency in that state provided that
state has a registration requirement for such offenders.").
230. This phrase is borrowed from STANLEY COHEN, VISIONS OF SOCIAL
CONTROL: CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND CLASSIFICATION 71 (1985).
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observation.231 This situation, in turn, is made all the more
invasive because individuals must update and maintain their
registration information, effectively compelling their complicity
in their own surveillance. 232 Indeed, the legislative history
231. See Foucault, supra note 228, at 207 (observing that "the seeing
machine was once a sort of dark room into which individuals spied; it has
become a transparent building in which the exercise of power may be
supervised by society as a whole"); id. at 203 (noting that panopticism is
concerned with "individualizing observation, with characterization and
classification").
This same surveillance effect was evidenced in previous registration
efforts. In 1950s Philadelphia, for instance, one local detective supported
registration because "it led the 'criminals' to believe that they were under the
surveillance of the police department. The registrant's feeling of constant
surveillance and obligation to notify the police of any change of address might
impose some regimentation upon the criminals." See Registration Ordinances,
supra note 60, at 64. The author elaborated:
In one case a Negro woman came into the Identification Division of
the Philadelphia Police department to report that she was leaving the
city for four days to attend her mother's fimeral and wanted to notify
the police so that she would not be in trouble when she returned ....
One individual reported that he had lost his registration card and had
come to the police right away because he did not want to get in
trouble.
Id. at 64 n.24. Another objection
is the psychic effect which it has on every man who has committed a
crime. It opens up old sores. It re-affirms the conviction that exists
in the minds of too many of these people that the police are anxious to
get something on them. The fact that this is not so does not matter.
The important thing is that this group of individuals feels that it is so
Current Note, Criminal Registration Law, 27 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295,
295-96 (1936)
232. In this sense, the interests threatened by registration and notification
resemble those protected by the Fifth Amendment, which in pertinent part
guards against compelled extraction of information by the government.
Professor Charles Fried offers the following analysis:
By according the privilege as fully as it does, our society affirms the
extreme value of the individual's control over information about
himself .... [Ilt is the point of the privilege that a man cannot be
forced to make public information about himself. Thereby his sense of
control over what others know of him is significantly enhanced, even
if other sources of the same information exist.
Charles Fried, Privacy [A Moral Analysis], in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF
PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 203, 214-15 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984);
cf NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (stating
"compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may
constitute as effective a restraint on freedom of association as [taxes or
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underlying the federal registration and notification law,233 and
well as President Clinton's words in support of the law, 234
signal an express desire for precisely this universal
surveillance and constraining effect.2 35
Finally, the constraint experienced by registrants is
exacerbated by a Damoclean-type anxiety, one that extends
beyond the constant specter of harassment and vigilantism
already discussed. 236 As one appellate judge put it: "One who is
watched, investigated, questioned and accused, albeit
informally, lives in fear of the moment of formal accusation and
its aftermath. People tend to think that if he did it once, he
punishment] ... were thought likely to produce").
233. See 139 CONG. REc. H10, 319-02, H10,320 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993)
(statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner); 139 CONG. REC. H10,319-02, H10,321
(daily ed. Nov. 20, 1993) (statement of Rep. Ramstad).
234. See supra text accompanying note 71.
235. Over thirty years ago, in his landmark study of the impact of then-
modem technology upon privacy, Professor Alan Westin recognized the critical
role of surveillance in the government's effort to exert social control:
Surveillance is obviously a fundamental means of social control ....
The whole network of American constitutional rights . . . was
established to curtail the ancient surveillance claims of governmental
authorities .... Writings by leading social scientists have made it
clear that observation by listening or watching which is known to the
subject necessarily exercises a restrictive influence over him. In fact,
in most situations this is exactly why the observational surveillance is
set up-to enforce the rules.
ALAN F. WEsTIN, PRIvAcY AND FREEDOM 57-58 (1967).
The universal surveillance associated with registration and notification is
not just compulsory but also largely actual, not merely perceived, which sets
the laws apart from the seif-regimenting influence of Bentham's Panopticon.
Nonetheless, it is a central component shared by both. See Whitaker, supra
note 227, at 36 ("Bentham's metaphor shows how surveillance can exact
compliance and be an effective tool for social control, but only to the extent
that the subjects of surveillance have no alternative to the Inspector's gaze.").
236. One aspect of this anxiety stems from the uncertain timing of such
acts, an uncertainty that in some ways makes the lot of registrants even more
angst-ridden than that of probationers and parolees. As the Second Circuit
observed with respect to a pendent threat of banishment experienced by
members of the Seneca Indian tribe,
[wihile "supervision" (or harasbment) by tribal officials or others
acting on their behalf may be sporadic, that only makes it all the
more pernicious. Unlike an individual on parole, on probation, or
serving a suspended sentence-all "restraints" found to satisfy the
requirement of custody-the petitioners have no ability to predict if,
when, or how their sentences will be executed.
Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 895 (2d Cir. 1996).
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will do it again."2 37 More formally, like the registration laws of
old,238 the current wave of sex offender provisions carries the
constant threat of re-arrest, and achieves compliance through
this coercive threat.239 As a result, like an offender free on the
basis of personal recognizance, 24° or a parolee subject to
"rearrest[] at any time,"241 persons subject to registration and
notification are constrained for habeas custody purposes.242
C. PRIVACY INTRUSIONS
Lastly, registration and notification impose a form of
custodial restraint due to the unique privacy intrusions they
engender. The laws mandate collection of a broad variety of
information (e.g., date of birth and social security number;
home and work addresses; identifying physical characteristics;
and crime of conviction), and then require affirmative
disclosure of the information to other citizens.243 Even where
237. State v. Taylor, 835 P.2d 245, 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (Agid, J.,
dissenting).
238. See Registration Ordinances, supra note 60, at 62-63 (identifying the
re-arrest of those who failed to comply with registration requirements as a
"principal" objective of circa 1950s registration laws).
239. Once again, the parallel to Bentham's Panopticon is evident. As noted
by Reg Whitaker, "Bentham believed that surveillance would ensure
compliance, without the need for coercion .... Yet compliance ultimately
rests on the threat of coercion." WHITAKER, supra note 227, at 35.
240. See Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973) (deeming it
significant that under such circumstances "[dlisobedience is itself a criminal
offense"); see also Sammons v. Rodgers, 785 F.2d 1343, 1345 (5th Cir. 1986)
(per curiam) (deeming the custody requirement satisfied when defendant is
subject to a suspended sentence threatening future imprisonment).
241. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242 (1963). To be sure, unlike
the parolee in Jones whose readmission to prison for failure to comply with
specified terms could be based on a mere administrative decision by a parole
board, any conviction for failure to register or to maintain registry information
presumably would be preceded by formal adjudication, with its procedural
rights and protections. However, it is indisputable that registrants, unlike
other community members, suffer from this specter of governmental intrusion,
which, though short of summary incarceration, at a minimum subjects them to
the threat of re-arrest on suspicion of a registration violation, a specter that
surely warrants some recognition in the custody analysis.
242. See Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 895
(2d Cir. 1996) ("Restraint' does not require 'on-going supervision' or 'prior
approval' [to satisfy the custody requirement].").
243. Consistent with this latitude, it is not uncommon for states to
expressly allow private dissemination of registrant information. See, e.g., N.Y.
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legislatively imposed limits exist on the intended spread of
registrants' information, such limits are so susceptible of
evasion as to be virtually meaningless.2 " This is despite the
fact that every jurisdiction has laws in place that threaten
penalties for the unauthorized spread of registrants'
information. 245 With the advent of the Internet as a method of
disclosure,246 the breadth and indeed indelibility247 of disclosure
CORR. LAW § 168-1(6)(b) (McKinney Supp. 2000) (specifying that "any entity
receiving information . . . may disclose or further disseminate such
information at [its] discretion").
244. See, e.g., Paul P. v. Farmer, 80 F. Supp. 2d 320 (D.N.J. 2000)
(enjoining New Jersey's notification law because it failed to impose sufficient
controls to guard against unintended disclosures by local authorities). The
court further explained:
A system of distributing this information with zero "leakage" to
unauthorized persons is, in reality, unattainable. However, the
mandate for the Attorney General is not to devise a perfect system,
but one calculated to achieve the goals of the statute without
unreasonably impinging on the "nontrivial" privacy interests of the
plaintiffs.
Id. at 325. The district court subsequently approved the State's revised
guidelines. See Paul P. v. Farmer, 92 F. Supp. 2d 410 (D.N.J. 2000), affd, No.
00-5244, 2000 WL 1277961 (3d Cir. 2000). Under the new regime, registrant
information contained in a flier will be disseminated in redacted and
unredacted form; the latter contains inter alia the exact home address of the
registrant, which is provided only to community members willing to sign a
receipt pledging that they will not disclose the information to unauthorized
persons and not harass the registrant, his family, or employer. Id. at 411. All
other community members will receive redacted information forms, which,
while containing all other information, reflect only the general area of the
registrant's home. Id.
245. The court in Paul P., for instance, noted forty-five documented
instances of misuse, yet not a single action for contempt was initiated. See
Paul P., 80 F. Supp. 2d at 324 n.8.
246. See supra note 78 (listing organizations that provide links to state-
initiated Internet cites). In addition to state-sponsored sites, numerous local
police departments maintain independent cites providing registrant
information. See id.
247. To quote Charles Sykes, "[diata is like a prostitute; [olnce it's on the
street, everybody has access to it." CHARLES J. SYKES, THE END OF PRIVACY
101 (1999) (citing an advocate for the mentally ill).
Given this ephemeral quality, it should come as no surprise that
enterprising citizens have seized the initiative to create Internet sites on their
own to disseminate registrants' information. See, e.g., www.jaye.org (site
maintained by Michigan State Senator Dave Jaye, disclaiming that the site "is
not responsible for inaccuracies") (last updated Aug. 1, 2000);
http://www.parentsformeganslaw.com/htmlIoffender.lasso (containing infor-
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has been increased incalculably. Other, emerging technologies
carry additional promise for intrusiveness. For instance, a
recent software innovation, known as "Megan's Mapper," now
permits law enforcement to generate thousands of notification
letters in minutes, making the labor intensive and time-
consuming job of notification far easier, more effective, and less
expensive. 248
The interest threatened by such disclosures cuts to the
heart of the critical interrelation between privacy and personal
autonomy and liberty.249 Although for decades, if not centuries,
social thinkers have struggled to derive a comprehensive
definition of privacy, the definition offered by Charles Fried is
helpful: privacy is "that aspect of social order by which persons
control access to information about themselves."2 50  Ruth
Gavison identifies the following functions of privacy: "the
promotion of liberty, autonomy, selfhood, and human relations
and furthering the existence of a free society."251 In his recent
mation on New York registrants "hand transcribed" by volunteers from
Parents for Megan's Law organization) (last visited Oct. 10, 2000); (Nicole
Brodeur, Looking Backward, Staying Alert, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh,
N.C.), Apr. 8, 1998, at B1 (recounting the rapid spread of information as a
result of private citizen's effort to print registry information from web site and
contact community members about a particular registrant).
248. See Rich Calder, Technology Aids Sex-Offender Alerts, May 24, 1999,
available at http'//www.apbnews.com (last visited Sept. 24, 2000).
249. As Ruth Gavison has observed, "privacy is seldom protected in the
absence of some other interest." Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of the
Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 346, 348
(Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984) [hereinafter Shoeman].
250. Fried, supra note 232, at 203, 218.
251. GAVISON, supra note 249, at 347; see also DAVID BRIN, THE
TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO CHOOSE BETWEEN
PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? 79 (1998) (describing privacy as "a wonderful, highly
desirable benefit of freedom"); JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, IN PURSUIT OF
PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 44 (1997) (observing
that "liberty, privacy, and autonomy are distinct concepts that overlap in their
extensions"); Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An
Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1000 (1964) (stating
"[i]ntrusion and public disclosure are merely alternative forms of injury to
individual freedom and dignity").
Even more fundamentally, numerous commentators have noted the
sociobiological origins of the need for privacy. See, e.g., Alan Westin, The
Origins of Modern Claims to Privacy, in Schoeman, supra note 249 at 56-74;
see also Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 69 (Ga. 1905)
(noting that privacy has "its foundation in the instincts of nature" and natural
law).
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book Charles Sykes writes that "[p]rivacy enables free,
autonomous individuals to interact freely and equally."252
Political scientist John Hall identifies a similarly crucial
relation, stating that "two facts give the individual a
meaningful sense of freedom: his ability to control information
about himself and his right to choose to separate the audiences
before whom he can play separate roles.'2 3
Conceived in this way, registration and notification surely
impose restraints plainly not shared by the public generally.
The laws single out for branding particular citizens, on the
basis of acutely stigmatizing information. As a consequence,
registrants lose the critical right to manage their personal and
social identities, 254 experiencing a loss of "self-ownership,"
which Jeffrey Reiman notes flows from unlicensed
informational disclosure:
Privacy conveys to the individual his self-ownership precisely by the
knowledge that the individual gains of his ability and his authority to
withdraw himself from the scrutiny of others. Those who lose this
ability and authority are thereby told that they don't belong to
themselves; they are specimens belonging to those who would
investigate them.25
In the eyes of their fellow citizens registrants thus become little
more than a despised fragment of themselves-a synecdoche,256
which deprives them of the individuality thought essential to
252. SYKES, supra note 164, at 227; see also Gavison, supra note 249, at
362 (observing "privacy is central to the attainment of individual goals under
every theory of the individual that has ever captured man's imagination").
253. JOHN A. HALL, LIBERALISM: POLITICS, IDEOLOGY AND THE MARKET
86-87 (1988). For additional discussions of the relation between privacy and
the exercise of political autonomy, see SYKES, supra note 164, at 84-85; Anita
Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 732-33 (1999).
254. See GOFFMAN, supra note 218, at 41-72 (discussing the empowering
effect on personal identity of uncontrolled information disclosure).
255. See Jeffrey H. Reiman, Driving to the Panopticon: A Philosophical
Exploration of the Risks to Privacy Posed By the Highway Technology of the
Future, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 27, 39 (1995); see also
Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 37 (Cal. 1971) (citations omitted)
("The claim is not so much one of total secrecy as it is of the right to define
one's circle of intimacy to choose who shall see beneath the quotidian mask.
Loss of control over which 'face' one puts on may result in literal loss of self-
identity, and is humiliating beneath the gaze of those whose curiosity treats a
human being as an object.").
256. See HELEN MERRELL LYND, ON SHAME AND THE SEARCH FOR
IDENTITY 50 (1958) (stating "[the thing that has been exposed is what I am").
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liberated social existence. 257  The unrelenting privacy
deprivation thus has an inevitable stunting effect.258
The preceding discussion, of course, assumes that one's
status as a convicted criminal is somehow "private," a notion at
apparent odds with the inherently "public" nature of the
criminal justice process. In its 1989 decision in United States
Department of Justice v. Reporters' Committee for Freedom of
the Press,259 however, the Supreme Court rejected the view that
individuals lack privacy interests relative to information
contained in publicly reposed criminal records. In Reporters'
Committee, journalists filed a Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) request to obtain the "rap-sheet" of a specified
individual believed to have ties to organized crime.260 The
Court concluded that the release would jeopardize a privacy
expectation, despite the otherwise "public" nature of the
assembled information: "Plainly there is vast difference
between the public records that might be found after a diligent
search of courthouse files, county archives, and local police
stations throughout the country and a computerized summary
located in a single clearinghouse of information."261  In
dismissing what it referred to as a "cramped notion of personal
privacy,"262 the Reporters' Committee Court emphasized that
"the fact that an event is not wholly private does not mean that
257. See Fried, supra note 232, at 210 (observing that privacy in its
"dimension of control over information is an aspect of personal liberty");
Gavison, supra note 249, at 363-64 (stating that privacy "functions to promote
liberty of action"); id. at 365-66 ("Privacy enables individuals to establish a
plurality of roles and presentations to the world. This control over 'editing'
one's self is crucial, for it is through the images of others that human relations
are created and maintained.").
258. See SYKES, supra note 164, at 221 ('The erosion of privacy asphyxiates
private life as it contracts the distance that separates individuals from one
another and from the state."); Kreimer, supra note 200, at 71 ("Unwanted
observation by others is itself a limitation of autonomy .... IT]he power of the
state to inflict the [associated] sense of vulnerability is itself a sanction."). See
generally Bloustein, supra note 251, at 1003 (arguing that the dignity-effacing
aspect of privacy deprivations serves to limit individual liberty because it
deprives persons of their individuality and human dignity).
259. 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
260. A "rap-sheet" typically reflects an individual's date of birth, physical
description, and history of arrests, charges, conviction, and sentences. Id. at
752.
261. Id. at 764.
262. Id. at 763.
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the individual has no interest in limiting disclosure or
dissemination of the information. 2 63
Five years later, the Court again examined whether
privacy is jeopardized by governmental disclosure of technically
"public" information, this time home addresses, yet another
form of information subject to disclosure under current
notification laws. In United States Department of Defense v.
Federal Labor Relations Authority,26 the Court concluded that
citizens enjoyed a privacy expectation relative to their home
addresses sufficient to warrant rejection of a FOIA request for
such information.265 The Court downplayed the fact that the
addresses themselves were otherwise publicly available in
telephone directories and voter registration lists, stating "[an
individual's interest in controlling the dissemination of
information regarding personal matters does not dissolve
simply because that information may be available to the public
in some form."266 Privacy was of special concern, the majority
reasoned, because the disclosures (in this instance of non-union
members' home addresses to union officials) threatened
unwarranted intrusions into the home (by means of unsolicited
mailings, phone calls or visits), a domain "accorded special
consideration in our Constitution, laws, and traditions."267
Although both Reporters' Committee and Federal Labor
Relations Authority arose in the statutory context of FOIA, and
hence cannot be interpreted to support a per se constitutional
right to informational privacy, the decisions underscore the
Court's sensitivity to the privacy issues implicated by the
release of conviction and home address information in
particular. Even presuming that such disclosures do not
jeopardize a constitutional right,268 they do, in the guise of
community notification, differentially affect registrants relative
to their fellow citizens. Notification, as the New Jersey
Supreme Court has recognized, "link[s] various bits of
information-name, appearance, address and crime-that
263. Id. at 770.
264. 510 U.S. 487 (1994).
265. Id. at 502.
266. Id. at 500.
267. Id. at 501.
268. But see Paul P. v. Verniero, 170 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting
the "general understanding that home addresses are entitled to some privacy
protection whether or not so required by statute").
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otherwise might remain unconnected. 2 69 The information
conveyed is "public" only in a most narrow, technical sense:
However public any of those individual pieces of information may be,
were it not for the Notification Law, those connections might never be
made.... Those convicted of crimes may have no cognizable privacy
interest in the fact of their conviction, but the Notification Law, given
the compilation and dissemination of information, nonetheless
implicates a privacy interest. The interests in privacy may fade when
the information is a matter of public record, but they are not non-
existent. 0
Moreover, if the threat of unsolicited mailings and phone calls
was enough to trigger privacy concerns in Federal Labor
Relations Authority when home address information was to be
spread,271 the well-documented history of vigilantism and
harassment suffered by registrants surly warrants some
recognition in the habeas analysis. 272
In short, in both a practical and metaphysical sense, the
privacy-stripping effects of registration and notification satisfy
the custody jurisdictional requirement. Although the police
powers of government arguably entitle it to single out persons
convicted of particular crimes for perpetual suspicion,273 this
269. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 411 (N.J. 1995).
270. Id; see also Artway v. Attorney Gen., 876 F. Supp. 666, 689 (D.N.J.
1995) ("MUnlike previous access provisions, registration and public notification
ensure that, rather than lying potentially dormant in a courthouse record
room, a sex offender's former mischief whether habitual or once-off shall
remain with him for life, as long as he remains a resident of New Jersey.");
Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 718 (Minn. 1999) ("While it is true that
the information regarding [petitioner's] case is available to the general public
in the form of court documents, there is a distinct difference between the mere
presence of such information in court documents and the active dissemination
of such information .... ").
For instances of other courts also recognizing a privacy interest as being
jeopardized by the bundle of information made available by notification see,
e.g., Doe v. Pryor, 61 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1231 (M.D. Ala. 1999); Roe v. Farwell,
999 F. Supp. 174, 197-98 (D. Mass. 1998).
271. See Federal Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. at 500-501.
272. See supra notes 191-196 and accompanying text; see also Poritz, 662
A.2d at 409 ("[Wihere as a result of the information disclosed under the
Notification Law, plaintiff may be exposed to uninvited harassment, we
conclude that disclosure of plaintiffs home address, particularly when coupled
with the other information disclosed, implicates a privacy interest.").
273. Basic notions of utilitarianism and democratic liberalism, however,
would militate against such a position. Professor George Fletcher recently
noted:
Punishment as an imperative of justice hardly makes sense if the
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:147
program of punishment fails to include an opportunity for the
offender's reintegration into society. There is no point to the
metaphor of paying one's debt to society unless the serving of
punishment actually cancels out the fact of having committed the
crime. The idea that you pay the debt and be treated as a debtor
(felon) forever verges on the macabre.
George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the
Racial Use of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1907 (1999); see also People v.
Pieri, 199 N.E. 495, 499 (N.Y. 1936) (Cardozo, J.) ("Persons who have been
convicted of crime and served the sentence imposed are not thereafter barred
from society or intercourse with other human beings; they are not outcasts,
nor to be treated as such."); Whitman, supra note 201, at 1090 (noting the
"dignity of the one-shot transaction the dignity that arises from our
marketplace right to complete one deal and move on to the next one, the
dignity that comes from our right to pay off a debt once and for all and be done
with our creditor").
Jurisprudential support for this position is evidenced in recognition of the
"private facts" tort relating to the publication of old arrest and conviction
information. The tort was first recognized in Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n,
483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971). Briscoe concerned an article published by Reader's
Digest entitled "The Big Business of Highjacking," which mentioned Briscoe
by name and detailed the events leading to his prior conviction for truck
highjacking. As a result of the publication, Briscoe's 11-year-old daughter, as
well as his friends, learned of his criminal history for the first time. After first
noting that dissemination of the names of current criminal suspects and the
circumstances of their alleged crimes warranted First Amendment protection,
id. at 39, the court held that fairness and the interest in criminal
rehabilitation warranted a different outcome with respect to past criminal
activity:
The masks we wear may be stripped away upon the occurrence of
some event of public interest. But just as the risk of exposure is a
concomitant of urban life, so too is the expectation of anonymity
regained. It would be a crass legal fiction to assert that a matter once
public never becomes private again....
Plaintiff is a man whose last offense took place 11 years before,
who has paid his debt to society, who has friends and an 11-year-old
daughter who were unaware of his early life - - a man who assumed a
position in "respectable" society. Ideally, his neighbors should
recognize his present worth and forget his past life of shame. But
men are not so divine as to forgive the past trespasses of others, and
plaintiff here therefore endeavored to reveal as little as possible of his
past life. Yet, as if in some bizarre canyon of echoes, petitioner's past
life pursues him through the pages of Reader's Digest, now published
in 13 languages and distributed in 100 nations ....
Id. at 41-42. See generally RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION §§ 10:37-
10:54 (2d ed. 2000); John A. Jurata, Comment, The Tort That Refuses to Go
Away: The Subtle Reemergence of Public Disclosure of Private Facts, 36 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 489 (1999).
206
2000] HABEAS IN THE INFORMATION AGE 207
right does not warrant analytic disregard of the intrusive
effects of modern registration and notification schemes for
purposes of habeas jurisdiction. They subject registrants to
privacy intrusions not endured by the public at-large, for as
long as their lifetimes.
IV. HABEAS AS AN EVOLUTIONARY DEVICE
As the preceding discussion establishes, registration and
notification impose a unique litany of tangible and intangible
constraints on liberty. Even if one were to accept the Ninth
Circuit's dispositive emphasis on tangible physical
constraints,274 the laws plainly require registrants to satisfy
affirmative requirements not demanded of others, and
otherwise impose distinct restrictions. Moreover, in intangible
yet perhaps more invasive ways, registrants experience
manifold other unique burdens-including expulsion,
psychological containment, and intrusions on privacy-that are
surely no less disabling. Together, like the effects of Bentham's
mythic Panopticon, the constraints gain their strength through
the pervasive power of information and its use. Registrants are
compelled to supply and periodically update information, and
this information is used by police and the community at-large
to exercise control over registrants, a technique very much in
keeping with broader penal and cultural trends.
Given these trends, it is only proper that habeas
jurisprudence evolve in a synchronous fashion, for, as the Court
observed over thirty years ago, "the development of the writ of
habeas corpus did not end in 1789."275 Rather, as Justice Black
stated for the Court in its 1963 decision in Jones v.
Cunningham,276 the scope of habeas "has grown to achieve its
grand purpose-the protection of individuals against erosion of
their right to be free from wrongful restraints upon their
liberty."277 If these benchmarks still apply, then developments
274. It bears mention that at least one member of the current Court
appears inclined to subscribe to the physical restraint requirement. See
Justices of Boston Mun. Ct. v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 339 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (opining that the custody requirement is satisfied only when
petitioner "is under physical restraint or under a legal restraint that can be
converted into a physical restraint without a further judicial hearing").
275. Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 66 (1968).
276. 371U.S. 236 (1963).
277. Id. at 243; see also Slack v. McDaniel, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 1603 (2000)
("e writ of habeas corpus plays a vital role in protecting constitutional
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in the preferred methods of social control must be reflected in
judicial understandings of the custody jurisdictional
requirement. Just as a century ago technological innovations
in the gathering and spread of information compelled the
common law right to privacy to distance itself from the
requirement that persons suffer actual physical intrusion,278
today the government's use of information to exert social
control warrants an analogous evolution in habeas
jurisprudence. 279
In the final analysis, it must be recognized, habeas is a
"high prerogative writ"2 80 the raison d'etre of which is to afford
relief to those petitioners who as a result of governmental
intervention suffer "substantial restraints not suffered by the
public generally."281 Just how "substantial" restraints must be,
of course, is a question of degree and one that ultimately falls
to the judiciary:28 2
Although in form the Great Writ is simply a mode of procedure, its
history is inextricably intertwined with the growth of fundamental
rights of personal liberty. For its function has been to provide a
prompt and efficacious remedy for whatever society deems to be
intolerable restraints. Its root principle is that in a civilized society,
government must always be accountable to the judiciary for a man's
imprisonment .... 3
rights."); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430 (1984) (stating that the
custody requirement has been "defined broadly to effectuate the purposes of
the writ").
278. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
279. See Kreimer, supra note 200, at 5 (noting that "[tihe expansion of
government knowledge translates into an increase in the effective power of
government").
280. See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830); 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *131.
281. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Serv. Agency, 458 U.S. 502,
510 (1982).
282. Although habeas is of statutory origin, the judiciary has been the
main animating force behind its ongoing evolution as basis for redress against
unlawful limits on personal liberty. See Developments in the Law: Federal
Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038, 1072 (1970) (footnote omitted)
("[S]ince the custody concept, taken from the common law heritage of the writ,
has not been defined in the statute, the courts have not felt constrained by the
statute in their elaboration of its meaning."); see also Yackle, supra note 11, at
1009 (stating the custody requirement has "quickly [given] ground whenever it
threatened to interfere with the development of an effective system of
postconviction review").
283. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1963); see also Poodry v.
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With this humanistic gauge in place, one would be hard-
pressed to find a federal judge anywhere in the land who would
honestly deem the consequences of registration and
notification, pervasive modern incarnations of informational
sanctions, as anything but substantial and intolerable.
CONCLUSION
As the popular media incessantly remind us, American
society is in the "information age," a time when mass collection,
storage, and use of personal data dominate the social, political,
and commercial realms. 284 While sounding alarm over the
expansive yet often subtle intrusions attending this shift, most
commentators are quick to recognize the benefits: our new
information-based society offers much in terms of efficiency,
cost savings, and ease of living.285
It should thus come as no surprise that the criminal justice
system has likewise perceived the utility of information as a
method of social control. Faced with burgeoning prison
populations, and wanting to extend its reach for as long as
possible over offenders (beyond the temporal limits of probation
and parole), the justice system has vigorously embraced
registration and community notification. As a consequence,
hundreds of thousands of sex offenders are now the subject of
Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 894 (2d Cir. 1996) ("A court
[must] judge the 'severity' of an actual or potential restraint on liberty.");
Harts v. Indiana, 732 F.2d 95, 96 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[W]hether someone who is
not under physical constraint can be considered in custody depends on the
amount of restriction placed on his or her individual liberty.").
284. See, e.g., Peter McGrath, If All the World's a Computer...,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 1, 2000, at 72. This shift in turn has triggered new
understandings of privacy. As one commentator recently noted, "[wihere once
the issue of 'privacy' was primarily having to do with one's physical seclusion,
one's personal domain, and one's physical withdrawal from society's gaze, it
has now come to include access to information about one's self." Robert A.
Reilly, Conceptual Foundations of Privacy: Looking Backward Before Stepping
Forward, 6 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 6, 39 (1999), available at
http'//www.richmond.edu/joltv6:2/articlel.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2000).
For discussions of the dramatic impact of new technologies on informational
privacy more generally, see, e.g., Steven C. Carlson & Ernest Miller, Public
Data and Personal Privacy, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 83
(1999); Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1193 (1998).
285. See, e.g., Joshua Quittner, Invasion of Privacy; Our Right to Be Left
Alone Has Disappeared, Bit by Bit, in Little Brotherly Steps. Still, We've Got
Something in Return and It's Not All Bad, TIME, Aug. 25, 1997, at 28.
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ongoing state control and community opprobrium, 286 often for
their lifetimes.287 This population includes not just persons
convicted of violent sex crimes (including attempts), but also a
broad array of relatively minor offenses, including those of a
consensual and/or non-violent nature (e.g., obscenity, peeping,
bigamy, indecent exposure, and sodomy),288 and criminal acts
vaguely deemed to involve a sexual "motivation" or
"gratification."2 89 However, as discussed, while today it is
principally sex offenders that are targeted, there is good reason
to expect that it is only a matter of time before other criminal
sub-populations will also experience the informational
286. See Megan's Law in All 50 States, available at http://www.klaaskids.
org/pg-legmeg.htm (providing state-by-state numerical overview of persons
currently subject to registration and notification) (last visited Sept. 24, 2000).
287. Included in this group is a significant share of persons subjected to
registration and notification after having been released from prison or jail
years, sometimes decades, before implementation of the registration and
notification laws in the 1990s. This is because at least sixteen states impose
registration requirements retroactively, with no time restriction, a situation
that sweeps up many persons convicted of non-violent, consensual sex crimes
heretofore the subject of aggressive police enforcement. See Robert L.
Jacobson, Note, "Megan's Laws" Reinforcing Old Patterns of Anti-Gay Police
Harassment, 87 GEO. L.J. 2431, 2467 (1999). However, because of the recently
imposed one-year statute of limitations period on habeas petitions, such claims
would likely be time-barred. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) (1994 & Supp. 1 1997);
Brown v. Odea, 187 F.3d 572, 576 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that petitioners
whose convictions were final before the effective date of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 have one year from April 24, 1996 to file);
Ross v. Artuz, 150 F.3d 97, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1998) (same).
288. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
289. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3821(C) (West 2000) ("sexual
motivation"); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-12-4(1)(E) (Michie 2000) ("vicarious sexual
gratification"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4902(c)(14) (Michie 2000) ("sexually
motivated"). The Minnesota registration and notification law extends to
enumerated offenses, as well as "another offense arising out of the same set of
circumstances." MINN. STAT. § 243.166(a)(1) (2000).
In addition to the broad, over-inclusive sweep of the laws, there is
increasing evidence that the massive governmental effort associated with their
operation is ensnaring and mis-branding individuals who, although convicted
of crimes related to a statutorily enumerated offense, do not fall within their
legal ambit. See, e.g., Anne Krueger, Convicted Rapist Sues Over Being
Wrongly Labeled a Child Molester, SAN DIEGO UNON-TEIBUNE, April 17,
1999, at B-3; Louise Palmer, Megan's Law Often Brands Wrong People:
Hundreds Challenge Registry, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Oct. 12, 1997,
at A10; cf. Akella v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 67 F. Supp. 2d 716, 731-32
(E.D. Mich. 1999) (denying due process claim of homeowners whose address
was wrongly listed on the Michigan sex offender registry).
HABEAS IN THE INFORMATION AGE
panopticon. Because registration and notification laws have
proved virtually impregnable to constitutional challenge,290 and
only very rarely are individuals afforded the right to contest
the legal requirement that they register and be subject to
notification, 291  habeas availability assumes critical
importance.292 The availability of habeas assumes added
290. See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
291. See Logan, supra note 74, at 626-33 (discussing the limited
availability of statutory rights of appeal or administrative review of
classification decisions).
292. No discussion of available federal relief would be complete without
brief mention of two potentially alternate remedial avenues: 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and the writ of coram nobis. For its part, however, § 1983 is neither intended
nor designed to free citizens from wrongful "custody," but rather is designed to
afford legal and equitable relief for constitutional wrongs of governmental
actors. See Martin A. Schwartz, The Preiser Puzzle: Continued Frustrating
Conflict Between the Civil Rights and Habeas Corpus Remedies for State
Prisoners, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 85, 104 (1988) (noting that "[rielease from
custody lies at the heart of the habeas corpus remedy. That relief, however, is
not available in a civil rights action"); see also Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90,
104 (1980) (stating that the purpose of habeas is "not to redress civil injury,
but to release applicant from unlawful physical confinement").
Coram nobis, on the other hand, much like habeas serves as a basis to
vacate a conviction, and importantly, carries no express requirement that a
petitioner be in "custody." However, coram nobis like habeas is an
"extraordinary remedy," which courts are loath to extend. As the Supreme
Court recently noted, the writ was
traditionally available only to bring before the court factual errors
"material to the validity and regularity of the legal proceeding itself,"
such as the defendant's being under age or having died, before the
verdict. ... "[lit is difficult to conceive of a situation in a federal
criminal case today where [a writ of coram nobis] would be necessary
or appropriate."
Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 429 (1996) (citations omitted).
Moreover, as noted by one commentator, relief under coram nobis itself entails
an exacting standard:
Because the justification of habeas corpus ends with the completion of
custody, the petitioner for a writ of coram nobis must show a
continuing civil disability that is serious enough to substitute for the
custody requirement. The governing theory is that the writ of coram
nobis should be reviewed under at least as stringent a standard as
the writ of habeas corpus.
M. Diane Duszak, Post-McNally Review of Invalid Convictions Through the
Writ of Coram nobis, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 979, 986 (1990); see also United
States v. Morgan, 39 F.R.D. 323, 327 (N.D. Miss. 1966) (stating that coram
nobis is "not merely a means of evading the jurisdictional prerequisites" of
habeas). Finally, and of particular significance to the discussion here given
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significance because jurisdictions in recent years have in
substantial part abolished parole, 293  a legal condition
recognized to satisfy the habeas custody requirement.294 As a
result, thousands of citizens will be barred from collaterally
challenging the constitutional validity of their underlying
criminal judgments, which have rendered them subject to
coercive governmental control, potentially for their lifetimes.
295
The Great Writ (what remains of it), true to its historic role
as a guarantor of personal liberty against unjustified
governmental restraints, must keep pace with the advent of
this new form of social control. What potentially stands in the
way, however, is the jurisdictional requirement of "custody,"
which itself has evolved over time from its initial requirement
that a petitioner's "body" be physically restrained. Today,
federal courts must evaluate whether the petitioner suffers
"substantial restraints" not "suffered by the public generally."
Conceived in these terms, judicial interpretations of custody
that look exclusively to tangible, physical constraints, such as
that evinced by the Ninth Circuit in Williamson,9 Henry, 7
and McNab,298 are simply anachronistic and not in keeping with
the fundamental purpose of the writ.
When almost forty years ago in Jones v. Cunningham the
Supreme Court disavowed the narrow carceral requirement, it
at once signaled its sensitivity to the expansive breadth of the
government's corrective reach, and, to the minds of some,
the overwhelming disproportion of state sex offenders, coram nobis is available
only to federal petitioners. See Yackle, supra note 15, § 35, at 162.
293. See generally MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 3-99 (1996)
(discussing limits); SENTENCING REFORM IN OVERCROWDED TIMES: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 3-121 (Michael Tonry & Kathleen Hatlestad eds.,
1997) (same).
294. See Jones v. Cunningham 371 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1963).
295. Although likely less common, refusal to deem the custody requirement
satisfied also effectively bars consideration of any irregularities associated
with the all-important classification determinations made by local authorities,
when a jurisdiction's statutory law provides for such discretionary
determinations. See Logan, supra note 74, at 602-19 (describing various
approaches used to classify offenders for registration and notification
purposes).
296. 151 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 1998).
297. 164 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub. nom. Henry v. Lockyer,
120 S. Ct. 397 (1999).
298. 170 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
299. 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
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untethered the custody requirement from any meaningful
limit.300 However, the custody requirement remains,301 and
arguably properly so. 302 By abandoning tangible physical
constraint as the sine qua non of custody, the Court freed the
federal judiciary to extend relief in response to the evolving
efforts of government to control deviance.30 3 And in so doing, it
allowed the writ to retain the necessary flexibility to address
emerging governmental forms of social control, and thus
preserve some of its greatness for times to come.
300. Indeed, the Court's disavowal of the tangible physical restraint test
has inspired some to question retention of the custody requirement altogether.
See, e.g., Yackle, supra note 11, at 1003 (observing that "[airguments for the
abandonment of the 'custody' doctrine are powerful"); Timmothy C. Hester,
Comment, Beyond Custody: Expanding Collateral Review of State Convictions,
14 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 465, 473 (1981) (arguing that "[plarties not in
custody... cannot be presumed to present less meritorious or significant
constitutional claims than persons in custody").
301. See Spring v. Cladwell, 692 F.2d 994, 996 (5th Cir. 1982) ("The concept
of custody has been relaxed considerably by the Supreme Court ....
Nonetheless, the custody requirement has not lost all meaning.").
302. See Waste Management of Wis., Inc. v. Fokakis, 614 F.2d 138, 140.41
(7th Cir. 1980) (stating the requirement "represents the balance Congress
struck between the interests of the individual in remaining free of unlawful
intrusion on his physical freedom and the state courts' interest in remaining
free of interference with their final judgments"); LIEBMAN & HERTZ, supra
note 15, § 2.4(e), at 83-84 ("The 'custody' requirement provides a sensible
rationing principle . ... Mt provides a sensible proxy for the nationally
important questions whose prior resolution has in fact jeopardized nationally
important interests.").
Government-imposed sanctions in the form of license forfeitures and fines,
for instance, would stretch beyond plausibility constructions of the express
"custody" contained in the several habeas petitions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c) (specifying "Itihe writ... shall not extend to a prisoner unless... [hie
is in custody . . . ."); see also supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text
(discussing decisions rejecting fines and license forfeitures as forms of
"custody" for habeas purposes). Interestingly, however, the federal habeas
statute governing alleged unlawful deprivations by states speaks of a "person"
not "prisoner," in custody, perhaps suggesting application of a more liberal
test. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(extending habeas relief to "a prisoner in custody under sentence" imposed by
a federal court) (emphasis added).
303. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430 (1984) (observing that
"custody" has been "defined broadly to effectuate the purposes of the writ").
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